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Summary 
 
Almost 150 
thousand 
persons receive 
regular social 
assistance  
 
Means-tested 
benefits are 
cheaper but not 
always efficient 
The regular social assistance (RSA) is the 
only benefit of substantial magnitude available 
to unemployed persons not eligible for insured 
unemployment benefit and currently the most 
significant means-tested cash benefit in 
Hungary. 
The advantage of means-tested benefits is 
that, since the scope of eligibility is narrower, 
they are cheaper for the state and better targeted 
than universal benefits. They have the 
disadvantage, however, that the evaluation of 
claims is more complicated, the benefit may not 
reach all in the target group and it may reduce 
the willingness to work. This paper is a first 
attempt to assess the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the means tested RSA using microdata. 
The take-up 
rate is usually 
well below 
100% 
 
 
Social benefits 
reduce willing-
ness to work 
both in theory 
and in empirical 
evidence 
According to international experience, the 
take-up rate of social programmes is far below 
100%, which is attributable to lack of 
information, the costs of applying for the benefit 
and stigmatisation related to claiming. 
 
Means-tested benefits conditional on un-
employment may reduce labour supply. They 
may generate a poverty trap, where the total net 
income available from employment would be 
less, or barely more, than the income available 
as a benefit recipient. According to empirical 
studies, means-tested benefits reduce the labour 
supply of the beneficiaries by 5-50 percent.  
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Household 
survey data 
show a take-up 
rate of 55-57% 
in Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In LFS based 
estimates, the 
RSA reduces 
the probability 
of becoming 
employed 
Using the 2003 Household Budget Survey, 
we estimated the take-up rate of regular social 
assistance to be around 55-57%. 83% of 
recipients come from the poorer third of 
households. About 30 % of the recipients, 
however, are ineligible claimants. 
Being well informed and having a strong 
link to the labour market are the factors that 
have the largest effect on the likelihood of 
claiming the benefit: the probability of receiving 
such benefits is almost 35% lower among those 
with no prior labour market experience. Higher 
school qualifications significantly reduce the 
likelihood of benefit receipt, which may be 
partly attributed to the stigmatizing effect of the 
benefit. 
Using quarterly Labour Force Survey data 
for 2001-2004, we find that both unemployed 
recipients of regular social assistance and 
persons on public work are less likely to enter 
non-subsidised employment than other 
unemployed or inactive persons. Controlling for 
observed characteristics, we find that the 
chances of male benefit recipients to take up 
employment in the next quarter are 35% lower 
than those of their non-benefit-recipient 
counterparts, while the same ratio for females 
was 30%. Other factors reducing the probability 
of employment include the duration of 
unemployment (by 4-6% per month) and the 
unemployment rate of the region (by 8% per 
percentage point). Due to the lower probability 
of finding a job, benefit recipients remain 
unemployed two years longer than their non-
recipient peers. This, however, may be 
attributable to the non-observed characteristics 
of recipients. 
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1. Introduction*  
In the welfare system, cash and in-kind benefits may take three 
main forms (Barr, 1998): 
1. insurance-based or “quasi-insurance” (Semjén, 1996) benefits, 
i.e., those based on some previous contribution, generally 
linked to former employment or earnings; 
2. universal benefits, with automatic eligibility if certain 
conditions are satisfied, irrespective of income; 
3. means-tested, targeted benefits, generally linked to an income 
test (e.g. the regular social assistance in Hungary). 
All three modes of support have their objectives, ideologies, 
advantages and drawbacks. In this paper we discuss means-tested 
benefits only. 
The purpose of the means-tested, income-linked benefit, or 
social benefit (Mózer, 2003) is to improve the income position of 
poor social groups. As its most important feature, eligibility and, in 
some cases, also the amount of the benefit depends on the income of 
applicants. Its advantage is that, in theory, the available resources 
can be used more efficiently. Its efficiency partly results from the 
fact that the same additional income results in greater (marginal) 
utility for low-income persons that for their higher-income 
counterparts; furthermore, when the same budget resources are 
allocated only to the indigent, income inequality may be reduced to 
a greater extent with the same expenditure. Thus we might say that 
such benefits have a greater impact on redistribution, or the same 
degree of redistribution can be achieved at a lower cost than with 
universal benefits.  
Its main drawback, on the other hand, is that the establishment 
of eligibility is more complicated, thus some of the public funds 
saved on the payment of benefits must be used towards the greater 
administration costs of establishing eligibility and disbursement. 
Another drawback of social benefits is their imperfect targeting: 
there are non-eligible recipients, while those that would, in fact, be 
eligible to receive such benefits are not always reached. One of the 
                                                 
* We would like to thank Endre Gács, Gábor Kézdi, Éva Kőnig, Gyula Nagy, 
Ágota Scharle and István György Tóth for their comments on the previous 
version of this paper. The authors have sole responsibility for any errors or 
deficiencies still remaining in the text.  
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causes is the frequent stigmatisation of applicants for and recipient 
of benefits, therefore some of them will rather do without the 
assistance. Partly due to stigmatisation and partly because of the 
narrow scope of eligibility (the benefits are financed from taxes, 
therefore non-eligible persons have no interest in maintaining the 
benefit or its level), the social backing of such programmes may be 
weaker than of the other two types of benefits1  
Finally, as another problem, targeted benefits may reduce 
willingness to work. This effect depends both on the eligibility rules 
and on the amount of the benefit, but there is general agreement that 
benefits tied to income offer a disincentive to the labour supply, 2 
and in certain cases may lead to a poverty trap. A poverty trap 
emerges when the increase of labour income does not increase, or 
even decreases, net income because of the higher tax burden or the 
loss of income-linked benefits. In a broader sense, the trap does not 
necessarily require net income to actually decline, it is sufficient to 
have a very small net income increase, thus the financial incentive to 
take up employment is very small or even negative (for more detail, 
see Chapter 3). 
The welfare systems of developed countries and in particular of 
the EU-15 member states may be classified into four main groups: 
(1) liberal, (2) Scandinavian / social democratic, (3) conservative / 
corporatist, or (4) southern European welfare models (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Sapir, 2005). The reasons for the evolution of these 
models lie in their historic background3, but by now the scope of the 
welfare system and the relative significance of the aforementioned 
three types of benefits have become the most important factors of 
differentiation.  
In countries that belong to the liberal category (e.g., United 
Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands), there is a strong emphasis on 
the responsibility of the individual and on market mechanisms. 
Accordingly, the weight of the social security system and of 
universal benefits available to all citizens is smaller than in other 
                                                 
1 The economic model, based on the median voter theory, is explained by 
Gelbach and Pritchett (1997), for instance. There is no empirical evidence for 
weaker political backing in Hungary.  
2 Most forms of benefits have some disincentive effects because they reduce the 
marginal utility of labour income. The negative tax rate is an important 
exception, as it can be used only by persons with labour income. 
3 Esping-Andersen (1990) provide a good overview; for its summary, see 
Németh (2004). 
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models. In the conservative model (e.g., Germany, France), the 
social security system plays the main role, thus most cash benefits 
are proportionate to the previous income (contributions). This social 
security system is supplemented by a medium-sized social benefit 
scheme in order to reduce income inequality. In Scandinavian 
countries, which generally seek to increase employment levels and 
to reduce income inequalities as much as possible, universal benefits 
are typical, and the number and significance of income-based 
transfers are relatively small. The welfare systems of southern 
European countries are underdeveloped as compared to the other 
models: eligibility, although determined centrally, is often difficult 
to enforce at the local level. The major part of benefits is tied to 
income, and further regulated by many additional criteria. As a 
result, relatively few people receive benefits, and the amounts of 
these benefits are low.  
Of the four models, Hungary is closest to the conservative one, 
though this similarity is not attributable to the significance of the 
income-linked benefit systems.4 At the time of the systemic change, 
the Hungarian welfare system consisted primarily of universal 
benefits. The main reasons were ideological: socialism promised full 
employment and equal benefits to every citizen – a selective benefit 
system targeting of the poor would have questioned the realisation 
of those achievements. In practical terms, the system operated quite 
satisfactorily. Against the background of a high employment rate 
and modest income differences, the relative income position was 
determined mostly by the number of children in the family, 
therefore the universal family support could effectively reach the 
poorest. After the systemic change, the increasing scarcity of budget 
resources and the growing ratio of people left behind, however, 
gradually strengthened the role of more targeted, means-tested 
benefits (Semjén, 1996). Nevertheless, the ratio of state budget 
expenditures on specifically income-test-linked cash benefits is still 
very low: they represent 6% of social spending5, or a mere 0.5% of 
GDP. Even though in Hungary some of the in-kind benefits are also 
income-linked, only the Scandinavian countries have a smaller ratio 
of income-linked targeted benefits on the international scene. 
 
                                                 
4 For more details, see Benedek et al. (2006). 
5 The 1.1% of general government expenditures, as indicated in Table 1, 
amounts to 5.96% of all social spending. 
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Table 1: Size of welfare and social benefits, 2004 
    Expenditure 
(HUF million)
As % of 
total 
expenditure 
As % of 
the 
GDP 
Welfare spending** 6504,6 68,29 32,0 
On social purposes* 1845,3 19,40 9,2 
1. Cash benefits* 1004,5 10,5 5,0 
 1.1. Insurance-based payments* 158,9 1,7 0,8 
1.2. Non insurance-based payments 447,5 4,7 2,2 
 1.2.1. Means tested 108,7 1,1 0,5 
 1.2.2. Universal 338,8 3,6 1,7 
 1.3. Tax allowances 398,1 4,2 2,0 
2. In-kind transfers 297,6 3,1 1,5 
3. Price subsidy 541,5 5,7 2,7 
Notes: The data in the table are cash based. 
* without pension;  
** The category of welfare functions includes education, health care, social 
security, social and welfare services. We consider benefits to be fulfilling a social 
function if they increase the income or consumption of poorer or disadvantaged 
social groups. 
Source: Benedek et al. (2006) 
 
In 2004, in terms of total expenditure, the regular child 
protection benefit and the regular social assistance (RSA) 
represented the most substantial items among means-tested cash 
benefits (Table 2). The government spent some HUF 70 billion, or 
close to 70% of such expenditures, on the two in aggregate. As of 
2006, the regular child protection benefit was abolished, thus the 
regular social assistance became the most significant means-tested 
targeted benefit. 6  
 
                                                 
6 In this paper we discuss only regular social assistance granted to the 
unemployed, leaving aside the effects of the assistance granted to the health-
impaired. The latter represent, on average, 6% of regular social assistance 
recipients. 
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Table 2: Main income-linked cash benefits, 2004 
 
 
Number 
of 
recipients
(persons 
th) 
Expenditure
(HUF 
million) 
Average amount 
thousand 
HUF/person/yr 
regular child protection benefit 670* 42 111 63 
regular social assistance*** 145 27 575 190 
nursing benefit 38 9 872 260 
housing benefit 162 5 673 36 
temporary assistance 630** 5 040 8 
extraordinary child protection benefit 270* 2 160 8 
old age allowance 7 1 447 207 
funeral assistance 75 1 275 17 
debt management benefit 3 783 261 
*  number of children in respect of which benefit was paid 
** number of benefit recipients (multiple payments are possible) 
*** unemployed and health-impaired together 
Source: CSO Statistical Yearbook 2004 and homepage of the Ministry of Youth, 
Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 
(http://www.eselyegyenloseg.hu/main.php?folderID=867, downloaded on: 16. 
February 2006.) 
 
In this paper, we are looking at the targeting and labour market 
effects of the regular social assistance to the unemployed, which is 
the most significant means-tested benefit. In the next chapter, we 
explain the legal background and operation of the regular social 
assistance. Then we review the theoretical foundations of targeting 
surveys and labour market effects, and the results of the relevant 
empirical studies. In connection with the targeting of any social 
policy programme, three main issues may be examined: First, we 
may analyse and evaluate the targeting of regulation, i.e., the 
percentage of the population that society wishes, for one reason or 
another, to support, that is made eligible to the programme by legal 
regulations. Secondly, we may measure the ratio of persons actually 
claiming the benefit within the eligible target group. This is shown 
by the take-up rate. The measurement of this rate is important for 
several reasons: a low take-up rate would endanger the principle of 
equal treatment (some eligible persons receive the benefit, others do 
not), as well as the attainment of the social policy objectives of the 
programme. 7 The third aspect of the examination of targeting is the 
                                                 
7 In the United States, for instance, it has been shown that the number of person 
living in deep poverty, i.e., below 30% of the median income, could be reduced 
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ratio of ineligible claims (i.e., overpaid amounts), which could be a 
problem if it represents additional expenditure for the government 
and results in the wasteful use of resources. The empirical study of 
the regular social assistance along these three targeting questions is 
described in Chapter 4.  
As mentioned above, means-tested cash benefits may act as 
disincentives to the supply of labour. In Hungary, where the low 
participation and employment rates of the population are among the 
most serious economic problems, the empirical investigation of that 
issue is especially important. In Chapter 5, we examine whether the 
theoretical negative effect of the regular social assistance on the 
labour supply can be verified empirically. Finally, in Chapter 6 we 
put forth recommendations for Hungarian social policy, 
summarising the findings of our analysis. 
2. Regulation of the regular social assistance 
2.1. The regulation of the RSA between 2000 and 2006 
 
During the 1990’s, benefits to the unemployed were tightened 
severely by the government on several occasions. As one of the steps 
in that process, the income supplement to the unemployed was 
gradually phased out from May 2000 onwards, to be replaced by the 
somewhat lower regular social assistance (RSA). Pursuant to Act III 
of 1993 on social administration and social benefits, as amended on 
severally occasions, as of May 2000 those active8 persons have been 
eligible for regular social assistance who are afflicted by health 
impairment or are unemployed, and their livelihood is not assured 
otherwise. In this paper, we examine only the targeting and labour 
market effects of the assistance to active unemployed persons; 
therefore we shall dispense with the discussion of the regulation of 
eligibility of health impaired persons. 
                                                                                                                                               
by 70% if the take-up rate of social policy programmes was 100%, that is, if 
every eligible person received the benefits (Currie, 2003). 
8 A person is active if he/she is looking for work and would be able to enter 
employment within two weeks. In practical terms, this means those registered 
unemployed persons who cooperate with the local labour office. 
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According to the rules effective up to April 2006, livelihood was 
to be considered to be not assured if the active-age unemployed 
person 9  
→had monthly income not exceeding 70% of the minimum 
pension (HUF 15,260 in 2003) and  
→had per capita monthly family income not exceeding 80% of 
the minimum pension (HUF 17,740 in 2003), and 
→he/she or his/her family had no property.  
The RSA supplemented the personal income of the applicant to 
70% of the minimum old-age pension. If the recipient had no 
income, he/she received 70% of the minimum old-age pension; if 
he/she had other income, he received the difference between 70% of 
the minimum old-age pension and his income. 
This regulation changed as of 1 April 2006. The double income 
condition (family and personal) was eliminated, and the benefit was 
transformed into family support. This means that, from that point 
on, both eligibility and the amount of the assistance depends on the 
monthly family income per consumption unit10". An unemployed 
active person is eligible for the assistance if the income per 
consumption unit in his family is below 90% of the minimum 
pension (HUF 23,220 in 2006). The amount of the assistance 
supplements the above family income to the eligibility ceiling, i.e., to 
90% of the minimum pension. The use of the consumption unit is a 
new element in the Hungarian social benefit system, and serves to 
define needs assessment in a more equitable manner. 
Those persons are eligible for regular social assistance who are 
unemployed, actively looking for a job and are no longer eligible for  
insured unemployment benefit. Just as in case of other 
unemployment benefits, eligibility is conditional on the proof of 
active labour market status. One can be awarded the assistance if, 
for 1 year before the application and for the entire duration of the 
disbursement of the assistance, he cooperates with the competent 
                                                 
9 The detailed analysis was performed on the data of the year 2003, therefore 
below we set out the eligibility ceilings effective in 2003. 
10 In the consumption-unit-based calculation, the head of the family has a 
weight of 1, other family members have lower weights, taking into account that 
expenditures (e.g., utility bills) are not directly proportional to the number of 
family members.  In Hungarian regulations, the multiplier assigned to the 
spouse or co-habiting partner is 0.9, the first and second child receive 0.8 per 
child, each additional child has 0.7 per child.  
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labour centre. An amendment in 200511 relaxed previous conditions 
in that persons who apply for regular social assistance following 
disbursement of the nursing benefit, child care grant, child care 
benefit, regular social benefit or other social assistance need to prove 
cooperation of 3 months rather than 1 year.  
One of the objectives of the regular social assistance is to 
encourage return to employment. This so-called integration 
programme contains, apart from continuous cooperation with the 
labour office, the obligation of the benefit recipient to participate in 
a 30-day public work programme organised by the local 
government. The legislators had two objectives when imposing this 
obligation: to eliminate persons who are unemployed only in formal 
terms, i.e., who are either unable/unwilling to work or who work 
on the black market while collecting the benefit; and to promote the 
re-integration of the recipient into a lifestyle required by regular 
employment, and to reduce the erosion of working capacity. 
Eligibility for regular social assistance and the amount of the 
benefit are determined by the local governments. The regulation 
allows local governments to depart from the amount specified in 
law in the upward direction. 
The number of regular social assistance recipients (Table 3) 
reflects the changes in the regulation effective as of May 2000. From 
that time on, persons who have exhausted their eligibility for the 
insured unemployment benefit could only apply for regular social 
assistance. The number of recipients, though it increased 
considerably in 2000 already, skyrocketed in 2001 and 2002, as the 
term of income supplement grant expired for the last of the 
recipients.  
                                                 
11 Act CLXX of 2005 
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Table 3 Number of recipients of regular social assistance, 1999-2004 
Average monthly amount 
per head 
Year 
Number of 
applicants 
during the 
year* 
Number of 
beneficiaries 
Expenditure
s (million 
HUF) Amount 
(HUF) 
Real value** 
(2004=100) 
1999 22 305 34 480 4 381 10 588 94,1 
2000 66 426 47 154 6 256  11 056 89,5 
2001 126 213 94 779 14 807  13 019 96,5 
2002 130 181 125 894 22 131 14 650 103,2 
2003 121 324 138 127 24 880 15 010 101,0 
2004 127 172 144 853 27 575 15 864 100,0 
* New applications during the year. 
** Calculated with the average annual consumer price indices. 
Notes: The figures in the table contain the unemployed as well as health 
impaired assistance recipients. The latter represent only approx. 5-7% of all 
recipients. 
Source: Social Statistical Yearbook, 2001-2004 
 
2.2. Problems with the regulation 
 
Until 2006, means testing for the purposes of the regular social 
assistance happened based on personal and family income. The 
combined use of the double income ceiling is infrequent in other 
countries, while family income is used in several countries. On the 
other hand, the definition of family in the Hungarian Social Act is 
rather narrow in international comparison.  
In most countries, family means members of the household 
linked by blood relationship or co-habiting partner status. In 
contrast, the regulation of the RSA considers the family to mean 
"nuclear" family, or more specifically, the head of the family, his/her 
spouse or cohabiting partner and children below 20 years of age12 
without any independent income. Thus the eligibility of any person 
above 20 years of age and living in the same household as their 
parents becomes independent of the income of the parents. In other 
words, under the new rules, an unemployed person living with a 
pensioner mother or with well-to-do-parents will be equally eligible 
for the assistance. Similarly, an active-age unemployed parent living 
                                                 
12 Children participating in full-time education are considered as family 
members up to the age of 23, children in full-time higher education up to the 
age of 25. 
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with his/her adult child and the child's family will also be eligible, 
irrespective of the financial position of the family as a whole. 
This family definition may be justified on moral grounds, on the 
basis that neither the parents nor the children are responsible to 
maintain a grown-up person. However, from the distribution angle, 
it would be more just to define neediness so as to include the income 
of every member of a household. Here, household means the 
statistical concept, i.e., the largest unit in which incomes and the 
costs of living are partly or wholly aggregated and re-distributed. 
Household-based eligibility takes into account the redistribution of 
incomes within the household, providing a better measure of real 
neediness. 
The targeting of the assistance is improved by the fact that the 
family income is to be calculated for consumption units rather than 
for persons when establishing eligibility. That is because the 
expenditures of the family are not directly proportional to the 
number of family members; therefore, under the former regulations, 
if identical income position is assumed, larger families were 
favoured, while the use of the consumption unit helps adjust the 
amount of the assistance to actual expenditures. On the other hand, 
the weights used for the definition of the consumption unit are 
different from what is customary in international practice: the 
expenditures of families with several children are assumed to be 
higher than they actually are, thus they receive a higher benefit than 
would be justified. Figure 1 shows the income where a couple 
would exceed the eligibility ceiling depending on the number of 
their children and the definition of the consumption unit. If the 
assistance is awarded based on the per capita income, a couple with 
two children will be eligible up to an aggregate monthly income of 
HUF 95 thousand. Under the new Hungarian regulation, they can 
be awarded benefits up to the income of HUF 83 thousand, while 
under the OECD standards, their income should not reach HUF 70 
thousand (Figure 1). In contrast, the actual expenditures of 
households with children as compared to couples without children 
(relative expenditures) increase much less than proportionate for the 
growth of child numbers. Actual expenditure rates are much closer 
to the ratios under the OECD1 standards than to the ratios assumed 
in Hungarian regulations. 
This paper reflects the views of the authors 
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Figure 1 Eligibility ceiling for the RSA in a family with a married couple, 
by definition of consumption unit and number of children, 2006 
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Note: According to the OECD1(2) standards, the weight of the head of family is 
1, the second adult accounts for 0.7 (0.5), children for 0.5 (0.3).  Source: Own 
calculation. For the limit calculation, the minimum pension is HUF 25800, the 
OECD standards Förster (2005),  
* the average of relative expenditures based on the year 2003 CSO HBS (second 
income quintile). 
 
By way of the criticism of the regular social assistance, the low 
eligibility ceiling and the low benefit amount can be mentioned. In 
the Hungarian system, most benefits are tied to the minimum 
pension rather than to the minimum subsistence level, as in most 
countries. The minimum pension was below the CSO relative 
minimum subsistence level indicator already when it was 
introduced, and it has been getting further away ever since13. Due to 
the relative devaluation of the minimum pension, the income 
supplementation value of the assistance (for instance, the regular 
social assistance at 70% of the minimum pension up to 2006) also 
declined. According to Kőnig (2004), this is the main reason for the 
drop in the number of recipients of means-tested benefits, and thus 
the de-emphasizing of social benefits in the Hungarian welfare 
                                                 
13 The CSO's minimum subsistence level calculation does not reflect the price 
increase of a given minimum consumer basket; instead, it expresses the average 
value of the personal consumption expenditures of households consuming a 
minimum food basket (CSO 2006) This is affected by inflation as well as by real 
income, thus the indicator specifies a relative minimum compared to an average 
household rather than an absolute minimum. As an average for the past ten 
years, the minimum pension increased at a rate above inflation, while the above 
relative minimum subsistence level increased more, at a rate close to the real 
income: this is the cause of the widening of the gap.  
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system. The change of the regulation in 2006 may have considerably 
increased the amount of the benefit in households with a large 
number of members; however, because of the absence of data, we 
have been unable to analyse this. 
By delegating the responsibility of establishing eligibility and 
organising public work to local governments, the assessment of 
applications has been moved closer to persons in need; however, 
due to the local differences in organisation and procedure, the 
uniform and equal treatment, which was the purpose of legislators, 
is brought to question. Fazekas (2002), who looked at the changes of 
the regulation of the regular social assistance in 2000, also reached 
the same conclusion; he said that the benefit award practices of local 
governments have diverged increasingly, mostly due to the size and 
financial position of the various local governments. 
3. The international practice of benefit payment and 
theoretical explanations  
3.1. The size of the take-up rate  
 
There is extensive international literature dealing with the 
measurement of the take-up rate (i.e., the ratio of beneficiaries to 
eligible persons) and, in particular, the examination of means-tested 
welfare programmes. In order to describe the diversity of the take-
up rate, we have summarised the results of some analyses from 
other countries in a table (Table 4). Most studies - though yielding 
different results in time and space and by programme - estimate the 
ratio of persons not receiving benefits despite being eligible to be 
considerable, at 10-75%. According to Currie (2003), the large 
differences between countries are attributable to the different data 
quality and to the differences in the eligibility rules of the 
programmes and their social backing. 
This paper reflects the views of the authors 
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Table 4: Results of studies of the take-up rate 
Country Programme Period Take-up rate Author 
Means-tested benefits 
USA Family benefit (AFDC) 1986-94 62 -70% Blank and Ruggles, 1996 
United 
Kingdom Income Support 
2000-2002 
 
2005 
86% 
 
90% 
Department of Work 
and Pension (DWP) 
United 
Kingdom Job search allowance  
2000-2002 
 
2005 
51% 
 
49% 
DWP 
France Income supplement (RMI) 1994-96 52-65% Terracol, 2002 
Germany Social assistance 1999 48% Riphahn, 1998 
Germany Housing benefit 2000 60% Kayser és Frick, 2001 
Sweden Social assistance 1995 20-30% Gustafsson, 2002 
Finland Social assistance 1998-1999 25% Virjo, 1999 
 
Insurance-based payments 
USA Unemployment benefit 1988-90 74 -78% Blank és Cards, 1991 
France Unemployment benefit 1994 80 – 85% Currie, 2000 
 
Summarizing the findings of studies of OECD countries, 
Hernandez, Malherbet and Pellizzari (2004) established that the 
take-up rate tends to be between 40 and 80 percent. According to the 
authors, the insufficient effectiveness14 of welfare benefits is 
attributable to some of the eligible persons not claiming the benefit 
(demand side), and also to the state administration mistakenly 
rejecting claims (supply side). In order to increase effectiveness and 
attain the social objectives of the benefits, the operation of both sides 
should be improved, which can be done through the simplification 
of the claiming process, improving the availability of information 
and greater integration of the welfare programmes (Hernandez, 
Malherbet and Pellizzari, 2004). 
 
3.2. Causes of the low take-up rate 
 
In economic models, the decision of an individual to claim a 
benefit he/she is entitled to is affected by three factors: foreseeable 
benefits and costs, and the information available (Moffitt, 1983). 
Assuming a reasonable individual, the more he knows about the 
                                                 
14 By effectiveness we mean the take-up rate. 
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benefit and the greater the difference between benefits and costs, the 
greater the probability of claiming the benefit concerned.  
The most obvious motivation for claiming the benefit is the 
financial gain: the higher the amount of the benefit, the greater the 
motivation for collecting it. The incentive provided by the financial 
gain is smaller if the individual has other financial resources (e.g., if 
he can get assistance from the family or friends) or if he considers 
the present financial difficulties to be short term. Having looked at 
several demographic groups, Currie (2000) found that in claiming 
social benefits, the most important factor is the expected amount of 
the benefit. Based on a quasi-experiment, where certain randomly 
selected groups were offered assistance of varying amounts linked 
to different income ceilings, Ashenfelter (1983) verified that the 
expected financial gain has greater significance (35%). 
There are also a number of costs associated with the claiming of 
a benefit. A small portion of there are cash (cost of transport), while 
most can be measured more in terms of time and effort 
(administration, queuing, collection of data, continued cooperation 
with the authorities). The significance of these so-called transaction 
costs is indicated by the fact that if we reduce them, the take-up rate 
will go up (Currie and Groger, 2002; Brien and Swann, 1999). For 
instance, in 1992 some conditions of benefits to poor families 
(cooperation with the authorities and job search) were relaxed in 
Canada; as a result, a 10% higher take-up rate was recorded in 2 
years’ time (Terracol, 2002). 
The stigma attached to the benefit recipient status represents a 
special form of cost (Moffitt, 2003). In most developed countries, 
being in employment and self-sufficient, i.e., earning enough for 
one's livelihood, is considered to be a value. The more you earn, the 
more successful you will be in the eyes of the community and the 
more recognition you will get. Persons not working and living off 
benefits deviate from social norms, and, as a result, the community 
may stigmatise them. For fear of that stigmatisation, some of the 
eligible persons may decide to do without the benefit. The 
restraining effect of departure from the norm is also present if these 
norms are personal rather than social. An individual may consider it 
a personal failure that he must claim a benefit, therefore he may 
decide not to do so. The stigma and its effects are difficult to 
measure on their own, so an approximation is generally given 
through other observable characteristics. Several studies have 
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shown (Coady and Parker, 2004; Currie, 2003) that ties to religious 
or other communities increase the feeling of stigmatisation, and 
persons without such ties more frequently participate in social 
programmes. Similarly, persons with a pessimistic outlook of their 
own future, who do not think that they can gain control of their own 
lives, will claim benefits more frequently (Blank, 1999). It has also 
been observed that as the eligibility criteria for a benefit are 
tightened, its stigmatising effect is increased (Coady and Parker, 
2004). 
Information about the benefit may affect the probability of 
claiming through more than one mechanisms. First, the eligible 
person must know about the benefit itself and about where and how 
it should be claimed (Meyers and Heintze, 1999). The information 
known to the potential claimant about the criteria of granting the 
benefit, the entire benefit system and the possible amount of the 
benefit as well as the administrative burdens related to claiming 
may also affect the decision whether to claim or not. In theory, the 
more transparent the system, the more the individual knows about 
the benefit and the more accurate that information is, the lower his 
so-called transaction costs and the greater the probability of 
eventually collecting the benefit (Bertrand, Luttmer and 
Mullainathan, 2000). Looking at the reasons for the low take-up rate 
of the US Foodstamps programme, Coe (1979) concluded that 15% 
of the non-claiming eligible persons were not aware of the benefit, 
and 35% thought that they were not eligible. In other words, in 50% 
of the cases the benefit was not claimed due to the lack or 
insufficiency of information. Daponte, Sanders and Taylor (1999) 
also found that the role of information was important; they 
interviewed 405 persons, and found that the subjective and actual 
eligibility of individuals coincided in only 40% of the cases. 
Furthermore, after the persons who thought to be ineligible were 
told that they had the right to claim, 80% of them actually applied 
for in within six months after the study. 
Stigmatisation and under-information are often impossible to 
observe, therefore their effects can be grasped only through other 
factors. For instance, in econometric models the type of settlement 
and school qualifications appear to be significant factors. They affect 
the take-up rate through transaction costs and, more importantly, 
through stigmatisation. For instance, persons with higher education 
degrees or living in villages feel the stigmatisation of benefits more 
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(Halpern and Hausmann, 1986), therefore fewer of them will claim 
them. 
 
3.3. Ineligible claiming 
 
The third question of targeting is the extent of ineligible 
claiming or overpayment, or leakage, due to the payment of benefits 
in amounts greater than justified. Hungarian regulations allow local 
governments to depart upwards from the benefit amount specified 
in law, thus the examination of the latter aspect of overpayment 
would be meaningless. Therefore in the study we only look at the 
ratio of claimants who are ineligible due to their personal or per 
capita family income. The problem of illegitimate claiming is the 
subject of empirical studies much less frequently than the take-up 
rate (underpayment problem), but when it is studied, a substantial 
overpayment of 20-55% is generally found (Coady and Skoufias, 
1999), which is attributable to the imperfect access to information of 
authorities and to administrative errors (Besley and Kanbur, 1990). 
 
3.4. Effects of welfare programmes on the labour supply 
 
The labour market incentive effects of welfare programmes and, 
in particular, targeted benefits, have been an important subject area 
for social policy literature. In the United States, the question 
whether the various welfare programmes change the labour market 
behaviour of the individual has been investigated since the 1960's, 
when the number of participants in welfare programmes increased 
substantially, while their labour market activity declined. Friedman 
(1962) and Tobin (1965) were the first to state that, because of the 
structure of the welfare programmes, a marginal tax rate15 above 
100% is very common, which results in a poverty trap (see page 6). 
That is, under a certain wage, it is not worth taking up employment 
because on the whole the individual and his family will have less 
disposable income than they would be able to get from benefits. 
Such situations, which reduce willingness to work, can be avoided 
through a negative income tax-type benefit, which gradually 
reduces the amount of benefit as the income of the individual 
                                                 
15 The marginal tax rate shows what percentage of an additional unit of income 
the individual would lose, at any given gross income, due to the rules of the tax 
and benefit systems. 
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increases, making sure that the marginal lax rate is always below 
100% 
Moffit (2002) states about the effects of the existing US welfare 
programmes on theoretical labour supply that they vary programme 
by programme: the expressly employment-linked wage supplement 
benefits have a positive effects, while benefits linked to an income 
ceiling but not to employment have negative impacts. This may be 
attributable to two reasons: on the one hand, benefits increase the 
income available without employment; as a result, there is less 
financial compulsion to take up work. This is the so-called income 
effect. On the other hand, social transfers, which decrease as the 
labour income increases, considerably change the relative marginal 
utility of labour and spare time, which in turn provides incentive to 
the gain-maximising consumer to choose less work and more spare 
time. This is called substitution effect. The size of these two effects 
depends on individual preferences, the initial labour supply as well 
as the size and structure of the benefit. In case of income-linked 
benefits, both the income and the substitution effects work towards 
reducing the labour supply, i.e., their labour market effect is 
negative in theory. 
Most empirical studies reported negative or neutral labour 
supply effects. Multivariate estimates relying on individual data 
have indicated the effects of benefits to poor families with children 
in the US (AFDC) to be negative (Hoynes, 1996, Meyer and 
Rosenbaum, 2001) or neutral (Keane, 1998), while the effects of in-
kind benefits linked to an income ceiling (foodstamps and health 
care) to be slightly negative. Moffitt (1992) attributes the difference 
in the results of empirical studies to the differences in the data and 
model specifications. In summary, he states that in the absence of 
means-tested welfare programmes, the number of hours worked by 
benefit recipients would increase by 10-50%, and these programmes 
have a negative impact on the labour supply. 
The negative labour supply effects of benefits are underpinned 
by the analyses of the labour market effects of the US welfare reform 
of 1996. As some of the key elements of the reform, the eligibility for 
unemployment benefit was made conditional on stringent job search 
criteria, and was limited to 5 years, furthermore, a so-called earned 
income tax credit was introduced, linked to employment, to increase 
financial incentives. Those changes, together with the general 
economic recovery in the late 90's, increased the labour supply of 
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former benefit recipients considerably, by some 31-50%, and raised 
their employment by 28-35% (Bloom and Michalopopoulus, 2001; 
Elwood, 2000). 
In Canada, based on a regulation effective before 1989, single 
males below 30 years of age and having no children could receive 
only 60% of the social benefit paid to other unemployed. This 
discriminative regulation offered a good opportunity for studying 
the effects of the amount of the benefit. It was shown both with the 
difference-in-difference method (Fortin et al., 2004) and the duration 
model (Lemieux and Milligan, 2004) that smaller benefits reduced 
willingness to work and employment at a lesser degree. 
In European literature, the effects of an insurance-based 
unemployment allowance on employment is studied the most16, 
focusing on the role of the amount of benefit and the eligibility 
period (Lemieux and Milligan, 2004). In theory, the insured 
unemployment benefit has effects both increasing and reducing the 
labour supply (Semjén, 1996). On the one hand, it moves the leisure 
time-income budget limit, thereby reducing activity and raising the 
reservation wage, which in turn increases the duration of 
unemployment. On the other hand, assuming that it is difficult to 
borrow without a job, the costs of job search can be covered from the 
benefit, thus the probability of finding employment may increase. 
Finally, the benefit provides an incentive to obtain eligibility, that is, 
makes employment more attractive than inactivity, even if only 
temporarily. Because of these contrasting effects, the total impact of 
the benefit on the labour supply can be established only following 
empirical studies. 
The incentive effects of means-tested benefits to the 
unemployed have been examined by fewer researchers, and often as 
compared to the effects of the insured benefit. That is, they examine 
how much the probability of employment or the duration of 
unemployment changes after the individual moves from the insured 
unemployment benefit (UI) to the social benefit. In this context, both 
Terrel and Sorm (1998) and Micklewright and Nagy (1998) found 
that the probability of employment increases as the termination of 
UI draws close, which testifies to the disincentive effects of the UI 
(potentially as compared to social benefits), rather than of social 
benefits themselves. Terrel, Erbenova and Sorm (1998) looked 
                                                 
16 The unemployment benefits in Hungary and the related impact assessments 
are described in detail by Bódis-Galasi-Micklewright-Nagy (2005). 
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specifically at the absolute effect of social benefits to the 
unemployed. Based on the Czech labour force survey data, they 
detected a significant negative labour supply effect, but only in case 
of families with several children, who were entitled to considerably 
higher social benefits than other family types. 
Several authors (Lemiuex and MacLeod, 1998; Blank, 1999) 
found that the eligibility criteria of benefits may affect forms of 
conduct other than willingness to work. choice between the formal-
informal sectors as well as the household structure and the “typical 
patterns of co-existence” (Semjén, 1996). In this paper, we do not 
discuss these incentive effects, constraining ourselves to analysing 
the effects on the labour supply. 
 
3.5. Former empirical studies of the Hungarian regular social 
assistance 
 
Several Hungarian authors have studied the targeting 
(effectiveness and efficiency17) of social benefits, in particular of the 
regular social assistance to the unemployed and the problems of 
their incentive effects. However, we are not aware of any specific 
study that would have aimed to quantify these, and particularly to 
measure the take-up rate.  
According to Kőnig’s (2003) aggregate statistics based 
calculations, the eligibility ceiling (in 2003, 80% of the minimum 
pension) is 30-35% lower than the relative poverty threshold18, 
therefore at least 100-120 thousand poor unemployed persons are 
not reached by the assistance. 
Micklewright and Nagy (1998) studied the probability of 
receiving income supplement and its effects on the labour market 
behaviour among persons whose eligibility for the UI had expired. 
Their follow-up survey19 revealed that the claiming behaviour is 
affected the most by the costs of claiming, the local unemployment 
rate had a positive impact on the awarding practices of local 
governments, while the per capita taxable income in the settlement 
                                                 
17 Here, effectiveness means the take-up rate, while (in)efficiency means 
illegitimate claiming. 
18 50% of the per capita median household income. 
19 Their sample included those unemployed persons who became compensation 
recipients in April-May 1994 and had 11-12 eligible months who were observed 
either until they found a job or until they exhausted their eligibility for 
compensation.  
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was not significant. The former one indicates that the local 
governments are more liberal in awarding the income supplement 
in areas where the chances of employment are poor. The per capita 
income also reflects the financial position of the local government – 
the fact that it had no observable impact seems to indicate that there 
is no difference between the benefit award practices of more or less 
wealthy local governments. In our duration model, the income 
supplement had no significant effect on job finding, i.e., it had no 
substantial observable disincentive effect on the labour supply. 
Therefore the authors concluded that “curtailing the benefits would 
not significantly accelerate the job finding of unemployed” (p. 423). 
The effects of the changes in the assistance to unemployed not 
eligible for the UI  in 2000 were analysed by Galasi and Nagy (2003). 
They wanted to find out to what extend the switch from the former 
income supplement to the regular social assistance altered the 
reemployment chances and income position of persons whose 
eligibility to the UI expired. To that end, they conducted a follow-up 
study with two cohorts: one consisting of persons who lost their 
eligibility for the UI in April 2000, the second, in May 2000. Those 
who lost their eligibility to the UI in April 2000 received income 
supplement, while those whose eligibility expired one month later, 
"only" received the regular social assistance. The comparison 
revealed that fewer people applied for the regular social assistance, 
and fewer were awarded, than for its predecessor. In contrast, the 
lower benefit amount and the absence of any benefit accelerated the 
finding of employment, while the welfare of those unable to find a 
job decreased. 
 
4. Examination of the targeting of the regular social 
assistance 
 
The purpose of the regulation of the regular social assistance is 
to improve the situation of the poorest segment of the population 
without any labour income. The legislation attempted to restrict the 
availability of the assistance to the target group by imposing strict 
income and wealth constraints. In this Chapter, we examine the 
three questions mentioned above in connection with targeting.  
First we will look at the legislative targeting of the assistance: 
what percentage of poor households are eligible and which criterion 
causes ineligibility. Secondly, we will analyse the take-up rate (i.e., 
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the percentage of eligible persons actually receiving the benefit) and 
its drivers. Finally, we will examine the rate of ineligible recipients, 
their identity, and the characteristics of those persons as different 
from other beneficiaries. Illegitimate use is possible because the 
awarding local government has no information about some of the 
income items to be considered for determining eligibility (for 
instance, income from irregular or illegal employment), thus they 
are assessed based on the information provided by the claimant. 
Another reason may be the administrative error of the institution 
assessing the claim. 
 
4.1. Data  
 
We used the year 2003 data set of the CSO Household Budget 
Survey (HBS) for the analysis20 The survey is based on voluntary 
reporting, therefore refusal to participate in the survey or 
concealment of income may results in fewer high-income and more 
low-income households in the survey than it would be realistic. 
Therefore it shows lower-than-real average income and 
consumption figures and considerably smaller income and 
consumption differences (CSO 1997, pp. 23-24.) However, 
comparison with the administrative data available about the regular 
social assistance shows that the sample is sufficiently representative.  
In our sample, we considered 241 persons to be benefit 
recipients. Using the HBS weights, this would be 130,602 persons in 
the entire population, which is 0.5% higher than the figure in the 
Social Statistical Yearbook and 2% lower than in the year 2003 report 
of the Ministry of Youth, Family, Social Affairs and Equal 
                                                 
20 We had two household surveys available: the HBS and the TÁRKI Monitor. 
The HBS has a separate option, under the economic status of the individual, for 
regular social assistance recipient status, and the income for regular social 
assistance is also a separate item in the income questionnaire, while in the 
TÁRKI Monitor survey, it is aggregated with income from other 
unemployment-related benefits. The number of benefit recipients and eligible 
persons is considerably greater in the HBS than in the Monitor. On the other 
hand, the HBS requests respondents to document their consumption in detail, 
thus functionally illiterate persons, who tend to be in the lower end of income 
distribution, may drop out of the survey. Therefore we are likely to 
underestimate underpayment. 
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Opportunities (129890 and 132749 persons, respectively)21. In terms 
of the regional distribution of recipients, the distribution in the 
sample is slightly different from the local government 
administrative figures disclosed by the CSO (Figure 2): as compared 
to the figures in the register, recipients are underrepresented in the 
Northern and Southern Great Plain and overrepresented in Central 
Hungary and the Southern Transdanubia in our sample. 
Figure 2: Regional distribution of benefit recipients, 2003 (persons) 
 
Source: CSO Social Stat. Yearbook 2003, and own calculations based on the 2003 
CSO HBS. 
 
4.2. What percentage of the poor is reached by the regular social 
assistance? 
 
The primary target group of means-tested, income-linked benefits 
is the poor. Therefore, regulation is well targeted if the eligibility 
criteria successfully delimit the poor, i.e., we must see the 
percentage of the poor covered by person eligible under the legal 
regulations. In line with international literature, we consider those 
persons to be poor for whom the per capita (as per OECD1) 
equivalent household income is below 50% of the median per capita 
equivalent household income. 
                                                 
21 The difference may be attributed to the fact that the MYFSEO uses the data of 
the Ministry of Interior, while the Social Statistical Yearbook relies on local 
government questionnaires. 
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Table 5: Legal targeting of the RSA (thousand persons, 2003) 
  Not 
eligible 
Eligible to 
assistance** Total 
Poor* households with at least one person of active 
age  91 ,1 53,3 144,4 
From 
which:*** 
Due to household income criterion  39 ,2   
 Due to personal income criterion 2 ,6   
 Not eligible due to labour market status  49 ,3   
*  Below half of the median per capita equivalent income. 
** Those households are considered to be eligible that contained at least one 
person eligible for RSA under the legislative criteria. 
*** To assess eligibility, we first looked at the household income criterion, 
then the personal income criterion, finally labour market status. If a household 
was ineligible based on more than one criterion, we classified it into the various 
groups based on the order described above. 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO HBS, with HBS weights. 
 
As a result of the RSA rules, 63% of the poor households were 
left out of the assistance (Table 5). This is primarily because the 
regulation makes eligibility conditional on household income (HUF 
17,400 per month in 2003) 33% lower than the poverty threshold 
(HUF 26,300 per month). In case of households satisfying the income 
criteria, the labour market status22 represents an additional 
constraint; as a result, some 50,000 households are ineligible to the 
benefit. 
Thus we found that assistance to poor households is severely 
constrained by the (overly) low income and labour market status 
legislative conditions of the RSA. The regulation introduced in 2006 
alleviated that problem: even though the introduction of the 
consumption unit deprived some 3,700 household of eligibility, but 
the abolition of the personal income ceiling and the increase of the 
family income ceiling brought some 5000 poor households into the 
scope of eligibility. 
 
                                                 
22 In the HBS, the question on labour market status (in the wording of the 
questionnaire: current economic activity) combines economic activity (active, 
unemployed, inactive) and transfer statuses (pensioner, childcare allowance 
recipient, etc.). The main alternatives: employed, member of cooperative, 
entrepreneur, unpaid family worker, on maternity leave, receives child care 
benefit, unemployed, pensioner, recipient of other regular social assistance, 
receives nursing benefit, receives disability annuity or disability benefit, lives 
off wealth, dependent.  
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4.3. The examination of the take-up rate 
 
According to the regulation, the assessment of the eligibility of 
any person depends on his labour market status, income and wealth 
position, cooperation with the labour centres and participation in 
public work. Of these criteria, the HBS allows the examination of the 
labour market status (i.e., whether someone is an active-aged 
unemployed) and the income position. Therefore the scope of 
eligibility as we defined it is probably broader than the actual group 
of eligible persons.  
According to labour market status, we considered to be eligible 
for regular social assistance those unemployed who reported to be 
recipients of regular social assistance or to receive no benefits at the 
time of the survey. 23 Furthermore, we classified in this group 
homemakers and students in part-time education, because in there 
case there is no condition to disqualify them, and they may consider 
themselves to belong to one of the above categories by labour 
market status rather than to be unemployed. On the other hand, as 
Table 6 shows, only a small portion (13.5%) of eligible persons fall 
into the latter two categories. 
The HBS considers the income and expenditures of the one year 
before the survey, on the annual level. However, in connection with 
the various income items, it only establishes for how many months 
the individuals received them, but it does not identify those months. 
In order to establish eligibility, however, it would be necessary to 
know the various types of income by month, because this would be 
necessary to establish whether the individual was eligible for RSA at 
the time of the survey. In the absence of that information, we took 
the annual income as the basis for examining satisfaction of the 
income criterion. 
However, this is different from the calculation method used by 
local governments. Pursuant to the Act24, for the calculation of 
income a maximum of 3 months are considered in case of regular 
monthly income types, and 12 months for other types of income. 
However, as eligible persons tend not to have any regular income, 
the difference is likely to be insignificant in case of personal income. 
                                                 
23 In the HBS, apart from the ‘unemployed’ category, there are the following 
alternatives: (1) receives no benefit, (2) receives (unemployment) 
compensation/benefit, (3) receives (regular) social assistance.  
24 Act III of 1993, Section 10 (1). 
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The difference may be greater in case of household or family income 
– this issue will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
By income, we considered those persons to be eligible whose 
per capita family/household or personal income was below 80 or 
70%, respectively, of the minimum pension (HUF 17,440 or 15,260, 
respectively). The family and household incomes may be different25, 
which may lead to different classification (see Table 6). The HBS 
primarily surveys household income, while the legal regulation 
pertains to the family. Therefore, as far as the data allowed, we 
attempted to also define eligibility based on family income. When 
defining family income, the allocation of incomes received on the 
household level (e.g., family benefit) represented a problem. Our 
approach was to allocate the child-related benefits in proportion to 
the number of children in the family, and other household-level 
forms of income in proportion to the number of family members. 
The decision about the inclusion of the various income items in 
personal or household (family) income calculations was taken based 
on local government questionnaires26. 
In the HBS, two questions may indicate regular social assistance 
recipient status. On the one hand, in the questionnaire, 'unemployed 
person receiving RSA' is an alternative response under labour 
market status, and on the other hand, income from RSA in the given 
year is measured among receipts. The responses to the two 
questions may be contradictory. We considered being beneficiaries 
those unemployed persons who, at the time of the survey, received 
regular social assistance, as well as unemployed persons receiving 
no benefits who reported income from regular social assistance. 
                                                 
25 In the HBS, household is “the entirety of persons who form a single economic, 
income and consumption community, and bear, partly or wholly, their regular 
living expenditures together. The concept of household is not the same as the 
family; it is not based on blood relations, it is not a legal concept; instead, it has 
economic content.” (CSO 1997, p. 63) According to legislation, family means the 
community of close relatives living in the same home, having a registered place 
of residence or place of abode there (spouse, cohabiting partner, child without 
independent income below the age of 25) (Act III of 1993, Section 4 (1)). 
26 In personal income, we included income from real property, non-regular 
benefits, pensions, nursing benefit and income received under other titles. In 
household/family income, we included all income received by the household 
(e.g., family benefit) and the net personal income of other household members 
(with the exception of income from tips, severance pay and cost 
reimbursement). Eligibility was established based on the total household 
income per household member and per month (see also Annex F1). 
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Furthermore, we considered as recipients those self-reported home-
makers and part-time students who had income from regular social 
assistance. Table 6 shows the distribution of recipients and eligible 
persons by labour market status. 
Table 6: Labour market status of recipients and eligible persons (2003) 
 Sample data (persons) Weighted data (persons th) 
 Recipient 
Eligible 
(family 
income) 
Eligible 
(househol
d income) 
Recipien
t 
Eligible 
(family 
income
) 
Eligible 
(househol
d income) 
Unemployed RSA-
recipient  237 179 152 129 ,4 96 ,2 75 ,8 
Unemployed 
persons receiving 
no benefits  
2 224 151 0,4 42 ,2 25,5 
Home-maker  2 44 36 0,9 16 ,6 13,1 
Part-time students  0 14 11 0 5,0 4 ,3 
Total 241 461 350 130,6 160,0 118,7 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO HBS. 
Using weighting to represent the entire population, based on 
the above definition, close to 119 thousand persons can be 
considered eligible on the basis of household income, and 160 
thousand persons if eligibility is determined on the basis of family 
income. Table 7 illustrates the relationship of the groups of eligible 
persons and recipients. 
 
Table 7: Distribution of recipients and eligible persons within the active-age 
population (thousand persons) 
  Non-recipients 
 
  a) 
Recipients 
 
b) 
Total 
 
c) 
Take-up 
rate 
b/c 
Not eligible 6 169,0 43,2 6 212,2 On the basis 
of family 
income Eligible 72,6 87,4 160 ,0 55%
 Total 6 241,6 130,6 6 372,2 
Not eligible 6 191,0 62,5 6 253,6 On the basis 
of household 
income Eligible 50,6 68,1 118,7 
57%
 Total 6 241,6 130,6 6 372,2 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO HBS, with HBS weights. 
 
The value of the take-up rate is 57% when calculated with 
household income and 55% with family income. These results show 
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that at least 40% of those eligible for regular social assistance do not 
receive it. 
 
4.4. Who receive regular social assistance? 
 
Below we examine who, of the eligible persons, eventually 
receive the assistance. The comparison of the main characteristics of 
(ineligible) recipients and eligible persons shows (Table 8) that 
among recipients, the ratio of persons living in villages is larger, 
they typically live in regions with higher unemployment rates and 
more of them live in households with at most one active member. In 
contrast, only 2.1% of recipients had had no previous employment – 
this ratio was over 12% for eligible persons. As compared to the age 
15-62 population, the ratio of men is higher both among recipients 
and eligible persons, while in terms of average age, recipients are 
older, eligible persons are younger than the adult population. 
 
Table 8: Characteristics of eligible recipients and of all eligible persons 
 Recipients Eligible 
(household 
income) 
Eligible (family 
income) 
Between 
the age of 
15-62 
Age 39,4 37,5 37,4 38,7 
Number of persons 
in household 3,6 3,9 3,9 3,5 
Number of persons 
in family 2,9 3,2 2,9 2,9 
Ratio of males 60,0% 55,0% 57,2% 49,0% 
Persons living in 
villages  57,2% 57,6% 56,2% 34,7% 
Unemployment 
rate of the county 8,2% 8,1% 7,9% 6,1% 
Never worked 2,1% 12,3% 12,0% 16,1% 
At most one active 
member int he 
household 
80,6% 79,8% 76,8% 73,7% 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO figures, with HBS weights. 
Simple averages conceal the composition effects, therefore we 
also used a multivariate model27 to find out which characteristics are 
different between eligible persons claiming and not claiming regular 
social assistance (Table 9). We separately analysed women and men, 
                                                 
27 The model estimates how the various characteristics of the individual, having 
eliminated other effects, influence the probability of actually collecting the 
benefit if eligible. 
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as well as persons eligible based on household versus family 
income. We also examined factors that we expected to have some 
effect on the collection of the benefit. 
Examples include, for instance, the estimated amount of the 
benefit, which we expected to have a positive effect on claiming 
because of the stronger financial incentive. Higher school 
qualification was expected to have a negative impact on the 
probability of claiming due to the stigmatisation effect. The absence 
of previous employment was expected to reduce the probability of 
obtaining the benefit, because school leavers are likely to be less 
familiar with the labour market institution systems, and have less 
information about the criteria applicable to benefits. The number of 
active persons in the family is also expected to have a negative effect 
on claiming because households with another active income earner 
are likely to have less need for the benefit. Finally, the stigmatizing 
effect of the benefit may be stronger in small settlements; therefore, 
all else being equal, we expect residents of small communities to be 
less inclined to collect the benefit. In the course of the analysis we 
also eliminated the effect of age. For the detailed description of the 
model, see Annex F2. 
Table 9: Effects of individual characteristics affecting claiming 
  Family income  Household income 
Variable   Men Women  Men Women 
Estimated assistance (log)*  0,0267 –  0,0462 –
  (0,725) –  (0,554) –
Household income (log)  0,0129 0,0096  0,0185 0,0127 
  (0,023) (0,165)  (0,034) (0,210) 
At most 1 active member int he 
household 
 
0,1243 0,1798  0,2641 0,1461 
  (0,074) (0,005)  (0,000) (0,059) 
18-24 years old  -0,0927 -0,0588  0,0275 -0,0838 
  (0,503) (0,653)  (0,866) (0,632) 
25-34 years old  0,0145 -0,0715  0,1278 -0,0925 
  (0,925) (0,621)  (0,526) (0,687) 
35-54 years old  0,0619 0,0143  0,1639 0,0033 
  (0,684) (0,923)  (0,377) (0,987) 
Elementary school qualification  0,0906 -0,1049  0,1234 -0,0844 
  (0,396) (0,284)  (0,247) (0,449) 
Skilled worker (technical school) 
qualification 
 
-0,0991 -0,1459  -0,1109 -0,1541 
  (0,334) (0,152)  (0,284) (0,201) 
Secondary qualification**  -0,2424 -0,1710  -0,1594 -0,1285 
  (0,023) (0,085)  (0,322) (0,285) 
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Household with at least one child 
under the age of 15 
 
-0,1636 0,0226  -0,1895 0,0239 
  (0,005) (0,747)  (0,008) (0,759) 
Never worked before  -0,2825 -0,3457  -0,2886 -0,3571 
  (0,001) (0,000)  (0,007) (0,000) 
Unemployment rate of the county 
(%) 
 
0,0582 0,0571  0,0677 0,0572 
  (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000) 
Budapest***  – -0,0573  – 0,0565 
  – (0,771)  – (0,842) 
City with county rank  -0,2693 -0,0099  -0,2890 -0,0011 
  (0,001) (0,924)  (0,001) (0,994) 
Other city  -0,0547 -0,0585  -0,0584 -0,0651 
  (0,398) (0,352)  (0,437) (0,342) 
Sample size   245 182  190 143 
Pseudo-R2  0,226 0,225  0,246 0,209 
* For women not receiving the benefit, the personal income is always HUF 
0 (and the estimated amount of the benefit is equal), therefore we left that 
variable out of the regression analysis. 
** There were no university or collage graduates among recipients, 
therefore we left that category out from the eligible group. 
*** Male recipients included no Budapest inhabitants, therefore we omitted 
that variable from the regression in our case. 
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors. The table shows average 
partial effects, with p-values in parentheses. The dependent variable was 
recipient status. Variables significant at the 10% level are indicated in bold letters. 
Benchmark: persons above 55 years of age, not having completed elementary 
school, persons living in villages. 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO HBS. 
 
We found that the factor with the strongest effect on claiming 
was having never worked before. All else being equal, this reduces 
the probability of receiving the benefit by 28 percentage points for 
men and 35 for women (which corresponds to 55-57% of the eligible 
persons on average, Table 9). There may be two explanations for 
this. On the one hand, it indicates the general level of information 
about benefits, because if you have never worked, you are less likely 
to have been informed about the possibility of benefits. On the other 
hand, it also indicates the links of the person concerned to the 
labour market. One third of such eligible persons are above 35 years 
old; in their case, information probably has less of a role. In this case, 
they probably are unwilling to take up employment, therefore they 
will not undertake to satisfy the criterion of cooperation with the 
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labour centre. Based on the available data, we have been unable to 
examine this eligibility criterion.  
The 7 percentage point difference between men and women is 
attributable to similar factors: the inactivity rate is considerably 
higher among women (in 2003, that rate was 32.4% among men in 
the 15-64 age group, and 46% among women of the same age), thus 
they are probably more likely to fail to satisfy the active job search 
criterion. 28 
The estimated value of the benefit has no substantive effect on 
claiming, which is probably related to the fact that in our sample the 
estimated benefit amount is the highest possible (HUF 15 260 per 
month) for 97% of eligible persons, therefore in this respect there is 
no significant difference between recipient and non-recipient 
eligible persons. 
As we expected, in families with a maximum of one active 
member the likelihood of obtaining the benefit is 12% higher for 
men and 19% higher for women, which indicates that the means-
testing is working. The positive effect of the county’s 
unemployment rate on claiming may also be related to this fact. 
Where the county’s unemployment rate is 1 percentage point 
higher, the probability of obtaining the benefit is almost 6% greater. 
As expected, the ratio of more senior school (secondary) 
qualification holders is smaller among recipients, which is probably 
attributable to the stigmatizing effect of the benefit. Secondary 
qualifications reduce the probability of receiving the benefit by 24 
percentage points for men and 17 points for women as compared to 
elementary school qualification. Based on the theory, we expected 
household income to have a negative effect, but we found a positive 
correlation. We wished to capture the degree of neediness with the 
variable, and we found that within the bounds of eligibility, the 
poorer a household, the less likely it is to receive the benefit. This 
may be related to the mode of claiming and its costs – however, 
more analysis would be needed to state this with any certainty. 
 
4.5. Who are the ineligible recipients? 
 
At this stage, we examined to what extent the ratio of 
illegitimate claiming is a problem in the case of the social assistance. 
                                                 
28 Persons who are in reality inactive may be eligible in our case because our 
scope of eligibility is broader than the actual group (see p. 26).  
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Local governments have no clear information about the income 
position of individuals, therefore the income taken into account 
when awarding the benefit may underestimate the actual level, 
therefore persons who are in fact ineligible may be found eligible. 
Using the definition of recipient and eligible person described 
above, based on household income, 48% of the recipients may be 
considered ineligible, while based on the family income as described 
in legislation, 33% fall into that category (Table 7). The examination 
of the causes of ineligibility (Table 10) reveals that the majority of 
recipients would be ineligible due to their household income, i.e., 
most recipients are in a better income position that the eligibility 
criterion specified in law. This is illustrated also by the relative 
income position calculated from the total annual household income 
(Figure 3): 20% of recipients are outside the bottom three deciles, 
while this ratio is close to 12% in case of eligible persons (both in 
terms of household and family income). 
 
Table 10: Causes of ineligible claiming (thousand persons, 2003) 
Cause of ineligibility On the basis of 
family income 
On the basis of 
household income 
High household (family) 
income 40 ,4 59 ,7 
High personal income  2 ,8  2 ,8 
Total 43 ,2 62 ,5 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO HBS, with HBS weights. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of recipients and eligible persons by per capita 
household income 
 
Notes: For the calculation of the income deciles, we took into account all the 
income recorded in the year.  
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO HBS. 
 
Figure 4 shows the income distribution of recipients by 
household income, taken into account for assessment. The first 
vertical line shows the eligibility criterion set out in legislation (HUF 
17,440). The figure reveals a break at monthly income of approx. 
HUF 22,500; few recipients have income above that level. In our 
opinion, the difference between these two “ceilings” may be 
attributable to the fact that based on the income data available in the 
HBS, the data in the claim form are impossible to reconstruct with 
certainty. The income reported in the HBS may be higher than the 
income disclosed in the local government forms because there is no 
benefit to be gained from concealing them. Alternatively, the 
difference between the income figures from the two data sources 
may be due to the fact that in case of regular monthly income types, 
the local governments take into account the three months preceding 
claiming, while we looked at the income during the year. Therefore 
recipients in the HUF 17,440 - 22,500 interval may be eligible 
recipients. 
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Figure 4 Distribution of recipients by per capita household income 
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Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO HBS. 
 
If we use a HUF 22,500 eligibility threshold in our calculation, 
the number of ineligible claimants drops by some 40%, thus the 
illegitimate claiming changes to 20% and 29% (based on family or 
household income, respectively) (Table 11). On the other hand, the 
less stringent criterion reduces the take-up rate (from 55% to 50%). 
However, because of the legislative criteria we did not examine 
(which affect effectively only the eligible persons, as these are 
examined at the time of claiming in case of recipients), the above 
eligibility is likely to be broader than in reality. That is, the take-up 
rate is more likely to be above 50%.  
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Table 11: Distribution of recipients and eligible persons within the active-age 
population assuming a HUF 22,500 eligibility ceiling (thousand persons, 
2003) 
  Non-recipients 
 
  a) 
Recipients 
 
b) 
Total 
 
c) 
Take-up 
rate 
b/c 
Not 
eligible 6 133,5 26,5 6 160,0 
On the basis 
of family 
income Eligible 108,1 104,1 212,2 49%
 Total 6 241,6 130,6 6 372,2 
Not 
eligible 6 150,9 38,2 6 189,2 
On the basis 
of household 
income Eligible 90,7 92,4 183,0 50%
 Total 6 241,6 130,6 6 372,2 
Notes: The table contains weighted figures. 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO HBS, with HBS weights. 
 
We also used a multivariate model (Table 12) to examine the 
characteristics affecting the probability of ineligible claiming. This 
helps to establish whether ineligible use stems from administrative 
errors or from abuse. In the next part of the analysis, we used the 
criterion set out in law (HUF 17,440/month).  
Illegitimate claiming may arise for two fundamental reasons: (1) 
if the individual in effect exceeds the legislative personal or family 
income ceiling but reports less when claiming, (2) the local 
governments' practice of awarding benefits is not strictly in line 
with the law, i.e., if different practices are in place in different 
regions. 
We have no direct data about the concealment of income; we 
tried to capture that factor in two ways. On the one hand, we 
checked how much the observed household income of the recipient 
exceeded the legislative ceiling, and on the other hand, by 
establishing the income of the household from odd jobs (per 
person). When submitting income statements for purposes of 
claiming the benefit, the applicant has a financial interest in 
concealing income, while there is no such motivation in case of the 
household survey, i.e., the income data in the HBS may be more 
accurate than the information collected by local governments. Thus 
we can assume that if the observed excess income increases the 
probability of ineligible use, this indicates that income has been 
concealed. 
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We approached the different benefit award practices of local 
governments by taking into account types of settlements and 
regions. In the course of the analysis, we eliminated the effects on 
benefit award of age, sex, school qualification and the absence of an 
active person in the household concerned. In contrast to the model 
used in the previous chapter, we analysed men and women together 
because the size of the sample did not allow for their separate 
examination. The model is described in detail in Annex F2. 
Table 12: Probability of ineligible claiming 
 On the basis of 
household income 
On the basis of family 
income 
 Average 
partial 
effect 
p-
value 
Average 
partial effect p-value 
     
Income per person above the legal 
limit (monthly, thousand HUF) 0,041 0,000 0,050 0,000 
Income per person from irregular 
work (monthly, thousand HUF)* 0,011 0,001 0,008 0,008 
Any active person in household 0,013 0,446 0,030 0,160 
Age 0,001 0,393 0,006 0,002 
Elementary school qualification 0,002 0,612 0,000 0,851 
Technical school, skilled workers 0,0004 0,003 0,000 0,942 
Secondary school -0,006 0,579 0,000 0,798
Vocational secondary school 0,006 0,646 0,000 0,465
Southern Great Plain 0,046 0,391 0,022 0,751
Southern Transdanubia 0,014 0,507 0,011 0,567 
Northern Great Plain 0,196 0,110 0,199 0,290
Northern Hungary 0,005 0,564 0,000 0,913
Central Transdanubia 0,160 0,468 0,003 0,860
City with county rank 0,200 0,021 0,063 0,178
Village 0,023 0,299 0,059 0,000 
  
Sample size  237 237 
Pseudo-R2 0,8298 0,8751 
* On the level of the household, we did not take into account the income of the 
recipient from odd jobs. 
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors. The dependent variable 
was ineligible status. Variables significant at the 10% level are indicated in bold 
letters. The benchmark was persons without primary school qualification for 
school qualification (there were no persons with higher education 
qualification), Central and Western Hungary for regions, and small towns for 
type of settlement (in case of Budapest, all (3) persons collected the benefit 
ineligibly, therefore we left these 3 observations out of the regression).  
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO HBS. 
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The results support the assumption that the concealment of 
income is one of the main reasons for illegitimate claiming. The 
probability of illegitimate claiming is increased by the per capita 
odd-job income by 1%, and by a thousand HUF departure from the 
family income ceiling by 4%. The results are also supported by the 
fact that if we look at illegitimate recipients by family income, the 
results concerning odd-job income remain valid.  
Furthermore, we found that there are no substantive regional 
differences in ineligible claiming, i.e., the differences between 
regional averages (Figure 5) are explained by the composition 
effects. In terms of settlement size, ineligible claiming is more 
common in cities with county rank and in villages than in small 
towns – so far, we have found no explanation for this phenomenon. 
Figure 5: Regional differences in ineligible claiming and per capita GDP, 
2003 
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Notes: For the per capita GDP of Central-Western Hungary, the weighted 
figures of Central Transdanubia, Western Hungary and Central Hungary 
(excluding Budapest) are disclosed. The aggregation is necessitated by the small 
number of elements in the sample.  
Source: Own calculations based on the 2003 CSO figures. 
 
5. The effect of the regular social assistance on labour 
supply 
 
Most of the empirical studies summarised in Chapter 3 
indicated that social benefits not linked to the condition of 
employment reduce the willingness to work and employment 
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among recipients. In theory, the effects of the regular social 
assistance on labour supply should be similar to those of the 
unemployment benefit (see page 19). There is also a budget 
constraint effect that acts as an employment disincentive; 
furthermore, the RSA increases the level of reservation wage, but as 
the amount of this benefit is lower than the UI, these effects must 
also be smaller. On the other hand, its effects acting as incentives for 
employment are negligible: eligibility is not linked to employment, 
and, because of its small amount, it may only slightly increase the 
search cost. Therefore we expect the effect of the regular social 
assistance on labour supply and, indirectly, on employment, to be 
negative. 
Even though from the aspect of employment and social policy 
the incentive/disincentive effects of benefits on willingness to work 
are important, we have no information in this respect. What our 
database allowed us to observe is the mode of job search and taking 
up employment. Considering that legislation formally prescribes to 
recipients the mode of job search, we could draw no definitive 
conclusions from that factor. Consequently, in this paper we 
concentrate on the relationship between recipient status and taking 
up work (employment), recognising the fact that becoming 
employed depends not only on the labour supply of the individual 
but also on the behaviour and demand of employers, and that this 
supply and demand effect is not separated in the analysis below. 
 
5.1. Data 
 
Consequently, we examine whether the fact that an 
unemployed person receives regular social assistance has any effect 
on the probability of his subsequent employment. For this, we 
needed a database recoding the labour market position and benefit 
recipient status in several points in time, because there is a time lag 
between recipient status and becoming employed (no one can be 
employed and recipient at the same time). Of the databases 
available for this purpose, only the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of the 
CSO was suitable; we combined the 2001-2004 data by quarter, so 
that we can follow changes in the recipient and labour market status 
of the individual. The quality of the social benefit data is 
questionable in that the LFS is not a survey directed specifically at 
income and benefits; therefore benefit-related questions are not 
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sufficiently detailed. However, considering that we have no reason 
to assume that there are systematic errors in the responses to 
unemployed and social benefit related questions, the database is 
suitable for the aforementioned analysis.  
As the first step, we combined the data of the 16 quarters 
between 2001 and 2004 into a panel. Most individuals would spend 
less than six quarters, theoretically possible, in the LFS sample. As to 
the causes29, we assume that this is not related to recipient or labour 
market status. 
The examination of the effects of regular social assistance on the 
probability of employment makes sense only in case of those who 
have potential for, and are able to, take up employment: i.e., in the 
group of active-age persons with capacity to work but having no 
employment30. Accordingly, we narrowed down, in accordance with 
the definitions generally used in literature, the panel to the 18-62-
year-old individuals who did not have even one hour of paid 
employment in the week directly preceding the interview31. 
The narrow sample included in the panel contains 15,844 
individuals. The lower quartile of the time spent in the sample is 3, 
its median is 4, its top quartile is 6 quarters (Table 13). 
Table 13: Time spent by individuals in the sample 
Number of quarters in the 
sample 
Number of 
individuals
Relative 
frequency 
Cumulated 
frequency 
2 3 397 21,4% 21,4% 
3 2 937 18,5% 40,0% 
4 2 730 17,2% 57,2% 
5 2 343 14,8% 72,0% 
6 4 437 28,0% 100,0% 
Total: 15 844 100,00% - 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2001-2004 Labour Force Survey. 
                                                 
29 In theory, the labour market survey monitors a person for one and a half 
years, or 6 quarters. One can be removed from the sample due to relocation, 
refusal to respond or change of sample (e.g., between 2002 and 2003). In our 
case, the number of observations in the sample was also reduced by eliminating 
observations from before 2001 and after 2004.   
30 That is, we have eliminated persons not looking for employment due to an 
illness, disability, nursing of a family member or studies. The remaining group 
is not identical with the unemployed under the ILO definition, because we have 
not used the criteria of job search and willingness to work.  
31 Public work was not considered regular employment as long as regular social 
assistance was selected among social benefits. 
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5.2. Effects of the social benefit and public work on employment  
 
Based on the result of previous studies, we expect benefit 
recipient status to reduce, and public work – in line with the 
intention of legislators – to increase the probability of subsequent 
employment, thereby “helping long-term unemployed to reintegrate 
into the world of labour”. Table 14 indicates a negative correlation 
between regular social assistance and employment, which coincides 
with our expectations. It indicates that on average 18.7% of the 
unemployed find work in the subsequent quarter, while the same 
ratio is only 9.5% among benefit recipients. 
Table 14: Ratio of benefit recipients finding employment in the subsequent 
quarter 
  Have he/she received 
regular social benefit? 
 
   no yes no 
no 79,54% 90,48% 81,34% Will he/she be 
employed in the next 
quarter? 
yes 20,46% 9,52% 18,66% 
     
 total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2001-2004 Labour Force Survey. 
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On the other hand, the relationship between public work and 
employment did not develop as we had expected. If the assumption 
that public work, as an intermediate step, offered some kind of help 
for returning to employment per se was correct, we should find that 
one is more likely to find employment if he had been in public work 
previously. However, our data seem to contradict that assumption: 
in the group of persons who had done public work, only 10.7% were 
in employment a quarter later, while the ratio among persons who 
had not been in public work is 18.84% (Table 15). 
Table 15: Ratio of persons in public work finding employment in the 
subsequent quarter 
  Have he/she done 
public work? 
 
   no yes no 
no 81,16% 89,27% 81,34% Will he/she be 
employed in the 
next quarter? 
yes 18,84% 10,73% 18,66% 
     
 total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2001-2004 Labour Force Survey. 
 
We should not draw far-reaching conclusions from the 
differences in raw ratios; they may stem from the special 
composition of benefit recipients and public workers. In order to 
eliminate this composition effect, and to find out how much the 
differences in the probability of employment are attributable to 
recipient status and public work, we need a multivariate analysis. 
We examined, using that method, the entire scope of persons not in 
employment, and the group of persons who had just exhausted their 
eligibility to the insured unemployment benefit (UI). 
For both groups, the regular social assistance had a strong 
negative impact on the probability of employment. In the wider 
circle, it reduced the probability of employment within the next 
quarter by some 20% for both women and men. This effect was even 
more marked among persons who had exhausted their eligibility to 
the UI: 75% of the recipient men, and 85% of the women were less 
likely to take up employment than their non-recipient peers. 
Accordingly, they remained unemployed longer: on average, 
regular social assistance recipients spent approx. 2 years (7 quarters) 
more as unemployed than non-recipients.  
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Public work also had a negative effect on employment: as 
compared to all the unemployed, it reduced the probability of 
taking up employment in the next quarter to 50% for men, and to 
70% for women. However, we must take these results with a pinch 
of salt. According to those who are familiar with the benefit award 
practices of local governments, most of this strong correlation arises 
from the composition of persons in public work, and the LFS has 
insufficient information to filter out that effect. That is because local 
governments tent to employ mostly those in public work 
programmes who in their view have no chance to enter the primary 
labour market.  
Our results indicate that neither the criteria of regular social 
assistance requiring activity nor the institution of public work 
achieve the intended employment effects. In the remaining part of 
the chapter, we describe the estimates leading to the above 
conclusions, and we also identify factors that, in addition to social 
benefit and public work, had an effect on the probability of 
employment. 
 
5.3. Probability of employment of unemployed persons 
 
In this section, we examined the probability of taking up 
employment (exit) among the observations in the combined panel 
from the first quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2004. If an 
individual in the sample took up employment as an unemployed, 
then became unemployed again, he would be included in the 
estimate more than once. In addition to variables describing 
employment, recipient status and public work, our regression model 
looked at other characteristics that may also have an impact on the 
labour market value of the individual and thus on the probability of 
finding a job. One example is school qualification. As school 
qualification has a strong correlation to productivity, employers 
prefer to hire applicants with higher qualifications. On the other 
hand, there is more incentive on the supply side to find a job as well, 
because with higher qualifications and productivity, higher wages 
are to be expected, thus employment has a greater gain over social 
assistance. 
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The effect of age on the probability of employment is less 
obvious. Practical experience accumulates with age32, whereas the 
human capital (special skills and experience) become obsolete fast, 
and young people are easier to train or retrain. The effect of age is 
complex on the supply side also. On the one hand, at a very young 
age there is less incentive for employment and earning a salary 
because there are often other financial resources available (support 
from the family or parents) and because, at that age, studies as a 
labour market investment are more profitable than later. On the 
other hand, as the individual gets close to the end of his labour 
market career, his incentive for more/better work lessens because 
he will be able to reap the financial benefits for only a short time 
(Galasi and Nagy, 2003). From these ambivalent demand and 
supply effects we cannot clearly establish the potential impact of 
age. The age composition of the unemployed, however, appears to 
indicate that both the old and school leavers find it harder to find a 
job than their middle-aged counterparts.  
Some factors have a different impact on the employment 
behaviour for women and men. They include variables relating to 
the family (marital status, number of children, presence of minor 
children, etc.). For instance, a large number or young age of children 
represents strong motivation for the male member of the family 
only, while for the women it tends to be a disincentive to work. 
Therefore it is reasonable to estimate two separate models for the 
two sexes.   
In our model, we also looked at the impacts on employment of 
the reservation wage, the various benefits to the unemployed as 
well as the length of unemployment, the labour market status of 
family members, regions, and variables describing previous labour 
market status. The table below shows the estimated effects on the 
two sexes separately (for the description of variables and the model 
specifications, see Annex F3). 
                                                 
32 This is reflected in the wage advantage of older employees over young 
persons with identical qualifications (Kertesi and Köllõ, 1997). 
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Table 16: Average effects of the various factors on the probability of 
employment of unemployed women and men 
Exit Males Females 
  APE p-value APE p-value 
RSA -0,0679 0,000 -0,0530 0,000 
Publlic work -0,0932 0,000 -0,0631 0,000 
Active labour market programme -0,0615 0,006 -0,0615 0,000 
Pre-retirement aid -0,0865 0,000 -0,0957 0,005 
Receives unemployment benefit -0,0326 0,000 -0,0231 0,003 
Reservation wage (thousand HUF) -0,0012 0,000 0,0000 0,000 
1. quarter 0,0517 0,000 0,0056 0,464 
3. quarter 0,0691 0,000 0,1324 0,000 
Number of months since registrated 
unemployed   -0,0054 0,000 -0,0058 0,000 
Number of months since registration  
(squared term) 0,00004 0,000 0,00004 0,000 
Working spouse 0,0777 0,000 -0,0021 0,678 
Nobody works in household -0,0535 0,000 -0,0467 0,000 
One person works in household -0,0229 0,002 -0,0145 0,038 
25-34 years old 0,0332 0,000 0,0435 0,000 
35-54 years old 0,0245 0,003 0,0816 0,000 
above 55 years old -0,0384 0,000 -0,0328 0,003 
Technical school/skilled worker 0,0823 0,000 0,0673 0,000 
Secondary qualification 0,1077 0,000 0,1053 0,000 
Higher education degree 0,3147 0,000 0,3393 0,000 
Without child -0,0267 0,000 -0,0235 0,000 
Family with 3 or more children -0,0381 0,000 -0,0706 0,000 
Small child 0,0358 0,000 -0,0846 0,000 
Unemployment rate of the county -0,5837 0,004 0,2597 0,228 
Central Hungary -0,0578 0,000 -0,0383 0,000 
Southern Transdanubia 0,0114 0,304 -0,0172 0,107 
Northern Great Plain 0,0108 0,338 -0,0067 0,489 
Southern Great Plain 0,0157 0,125 -0,0121 0,178 
Northern Hungary -0,0045 0,698 -0,0175 0,095 
Previously studied -0,0295 0,012 -0,0226 0,105 
Previously soldier 0,0136 0,476 -0,0809 0,278 
Previously home-maker -0,0694 0,012 -0,0241 0,101 
Previously received child care 
allowance/child care fee -0,1191 0,000 0,0394 0,004 
Previously other -0,0239 0,039 0,0101 0,543 
2001 -0,0535 0,000 -0,0136 0,195 
2002 -0,0403 0,000 -0,0023 0,822 
Sample size  22 153 22 082 
Pseudo-R2 0,1015 0,1404 
This paper reflects the views of the authors 
 48 
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors. The dependent variable 
was taking up employment (exit). Variables significant at the 10% level are 
indicated in bold letters. The control group was the 18-24-year-old age group 
for age, persons with no more than elementary education for school 
qualification, employed persons for previous labour market status, and Central 
Transdanubia for regions. 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2001-2004 Labour Force Survey. 
 
The table shows that both benefit recipients and persons in 
public work are less likely to find employment in a quarter. The 
receiving of regular social assistance reduces the probability of 
finding employment in the next quarter on average by 5.3 
percentage points for women and 6.8 percentage points for men; in 
the case of public work, the corresponding figures are 6.3 for women 
and 9.3 for men. Considering that the probability of finding work is 
18.7% on average for the entire group, the above figures indicate a 
strong impact (an over 30-50% 33 reduction of probability).  
It is not certain, however, that those figures really show the 
disincentive effect of the assistance and of public work. In theory, 
the higher the benefit, the greater the expected disincentive effect. In 
contrast, in our model the UI, which is higher than the regular social 
assistance, has a more modest effect that the RSA, which may 
indicate that the coefficient of the RSA variable reflects not only the 
disincentive effect of the benefit but also the effects of other 
variables not observed or not incorporated in the model, which set 
apart the regular social assistance recipient group from other 
unemployed. These may be “subjective" factors such as attitude, 
internal motivation, resourcefulness, self-confidence, perseverance, 
social network, which we have no information about but which 
affect the probability of employment. Therefore the actual 
disincentive effect of the regular social assistance and public work 
may be less than the value we measured.  
We measured age in cohorts, the effect of which was in line 
with expectations: unemployed persons above 55 years old find it 
the hardest to become employed; compared to them, persons below 
24 were 3.3-3.8 percentage points, the middle cohorts 6.2-11.4 
                                                 
33 Regular social assistance reduces the probability of employment to 18.34-5.3= 
13.04% for women, and to 18.98-6.8=12.18% for men, which is a 30-35% 
decrease. Public work changes the probability of employment to 18.34-6.3= 
1.04% for women and 18.98-9.3=9.85% for men, corresponding to a decline of 
35-50%. 
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percentage points34 more likely to be working a quarter later. For 
both sexes, the probability of finding employment increases 
significantly as qualifications become higher and decreases with the 
time since last in employment. As expected, the presence of small 
children in the family affects the behaviour of men and women 
differently: the presence of a child below years of age made men 3.6 
percentage points more likely and women 8.5 percentage points less 
likely to take up employment. The estimated effects are not very 
substantial, but taking into account the average probability of 
employment (18.7%), they are not insignificant either. For instance, 
the fact that no one works in the family reduces the average 
probability of finding a job by 5.4 percentage points, i.e., 
0.054/0.186=27%. 
 
5.4. The probability of reemployment and the duration of 
unemployment of persons who exhausted their eligibility to UI  
 
It is reasonable to ask whether we have introduced a distortion 
in the above estimate by treating the unemployed in a uniform 
manner, irrespective of their work history and the duration of their 
past unemployment. Therefore we also looked at the effects of the 
benefit and public work using another, so-called duration model. In 
this model, the probabilistic hazard of finding employment is 
expressed as a function of the observed personal characteristics of 
the unemployed persons and the time spent as an unemployed in 
the observation. We analysed only those unemployed who exhausted 
their eligibility for UI during the observation period. That is because 
they can be assumed to form a relatively homogeneous group in 
terms of work history and links to the labour market. Thus we 
restricted our sample to a total of 922 persons; their breakdown by 
age and the number of quarters spent in observation after expiry of 
eligibility for the UI are shown in Table 17. 
 
                                                 
34 Men between 25-34 years of age were 3.3% more likely to become employed, 
i.e., they were 3.3+3.8=7.1% more likely than their over-55 counterparts. The 
same rate for 35-54-year-old men was 6.2, women in the 25-34 year age group 
are 7.5, women between 35-54 years of age, 11.4% more likely to find work than 
their peers above 55.  
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Table 17: Persons exhausting their eligibility for UI in the 3rd quarter and 
the number of quarters they spent in the observation 
Number of quarters 
in the sample Male Female Total 
2 190 153 343 
3 168 105 273 
4 135 69 204 
5 55 47 102 
Total 548 374 922 
 
As compared to the total group of unemployed, the probability 
of finding employment in the next quarter is much smaller among 
this group: instead of the pervious 18.98 and 18.34%, now it is 7.88 
and 6.46% (Table 18). 
Table 18: Ratio of unemployed exhausting eligibility for UI who find work, 
by sex  
   Males Females Total 
No 92,12% 93,54% 92,69% Will he/she be employed 
in the next quarter? Yes 7,88% 6,46% 7,31% 
 total 100% 100% 100% 
 
As, like in the previous model, we also examined the 
probability of taking up employment, we considered more or less 
the same factors, except for the variables indicating the durations. 
However, of these factors, we left in the model only those the effects 
of which turned out to be significant or proved significant together 
with other variables (based on an F-test). We estimated the effects of 
the variables using several35 duration models, which yielded very 
similar results. 
 
                                                 
35 multi-stage and continuous time, parametric and non-parametric models. Of 
these, we disclose the Jenkins estimates, which is an estimated using a multi-
stage model and logit function. 
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Table 19: Average effect of various factors on the hazard of taking up 
employment 
 Males Females 
Becoming employed APE p-value APE p-value 
RSA -0,0596 0,005 -0,0557 0,077 
Public work - - - - 
Quarter 1 0,0014 0,953 -0,0506 0,080 
Quarter 2 0,0072 0,730 0,0153 0,539 
Quarter 3 -0,0299 0,095 -0,0174 0,459 
18-24 years old 0,0990 0,088 0,0827 0,000 
25-34 years old 0,0676 0,171 0,0647 0,000 
35-54 years old 0,0790 0,085 0,0406 0,000 
Elementary school 0,0152 0,666 0,0123 0,784 
Technical school/skilled 
worker 0,0321 0,433 0,0077 0,878 
Secondary school - - -0,0159 0,709 
Vocational secondary 
school 0,0422 0,368 0,0425 0,494 
Working spouse 0,0236 0,209 -0,0027 0,891 
Household with child(ren) 0,0109 0,560 -0,0011 0,967 
Unemployment rate of the 
region -0,2678 0,017 -0,2318 0,159 
Number of months since 
registrated unemployed   -0,0111 0,000 -0,0104 0,002 
Number of months since 
registrated unemployed  
(squared term) 
0,0001 0,000 0,0001 0,000 
t2 -0,1976 0,010 -0,5727 0,000 
t3 -0,1597 0,003 -0,3593 0,000 
t4 -0,1266 0,000 - - 
t5 -0,1190 0,002 -0,3512 0,000 
Year 1 0,0981 0,064 0,1438 0,066 
Year 2 0,0633 0,068 0,0957 0,066 
Year 3 -0,0048 0,924 0,0564 0,461 
Number of observations 1 023 607 
Prob> chi2: 0,000 0,000 
 
Notes: The estimates were made using a logit function, where the dependent 
variable was the probability of taking up employment. Variables significant at 
the 10% level are indicated in bold letters. The control group was the 55-62-
year-old age group for age, and persons with no more than elementary 
education for school qualification. 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2001-2004 Labour Force Survey. 
 
In this group, the effect of public work could not be estimated 
statistically because, of the small number of unemployed in public 
work (51 out of 1053 observed men, 31 out of 607 women), no one 
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took up employment. In contrast, the effect of the regular social 
assistance is significant and negative: benefit recipient men are 6.9 
percentage points, women 5.6 percentage points less likely to take 
up employment than their non-recipient counterparts, taking into 
consideration also the time since the exhaustion of eligibility to the 
UI. The size of the effect must be viewed in light of the fact that the 
likelihood of taking up employment in the quarter after the 
observation is on average 7.9% for men and 6.5% for women. That 
is, men recipients of regular social assistance have one quarter36, 
women 85% less chance to become employed than their non-
recipient peers. Though to a lesser extent, but it is still a valid 
concern that recipients may represent a special group within the 
examined persons, which, as a result, may also reflect the effects of 
non-observed factors other than the disincentive effect. That is 
because, even though in certain respects of their labour market links 
and work history, we have made the observed group homogeneous, 
this has not made the recipients any more similar to the non-
recipients in terms of the probability of taking up employment.  
As compared to the model described in Table 16, there are 
fewer variables with significant impacts in the duration model. One 
reason may be the much smaller number of elements, but it may 
also be attributable to the greater homogeneity of the group. In 
contrast to the qualifications and the characteristics of the 
household, age does have an effect on the probability of 
employment: younger males were 7-10 percentage points more 
likely to find employment, and women 4-8 percentage points more 
likely, than the age cohort above 55. The past duration of 
unemployment and, for males, the unemployment rate of the region 
had a negative effect on the probability of employment.  
Using the probabilistic hazards, the duration of staying 
unemployed after entering the scope of observation can be 
calculated; adding that to the time of unemployment before the 
observation period, we can also estimate the total duration of 
unemployment after the loss of the latest job (Table 20). Based on 
those estimates we can conclude that among the unemployed 
persons who have just exhausted their eligibility to UI, those who 
receive RSA remain unemployed 7 quarters (almost 2 years) longer 
than non-recipients. 
                                                 
36 Thus, benefit recipient men have a chance of 7.9%-5.9%=2%, and women, 
6.5%-5.5%-1%, to be employed a quarter later. 
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Table 20: Average duration of unemployment in quarters 
   Mean St. error 
Number of 
observations 
no 9,77 5,96 567 Does he/she 
receive RSA? yes 16,16 7,24 355 
 Total 12,23 7,19 922 
Source: Own calculations based on the 2001-2004 Labour Force Survey. 
 
6. Summary and recommendations 
 
The regular social assistance (RSA) is the only assistance of 
substantial magnitude available to persons not eligible for insured 
unemployment benefit. It is paid to almost 150 thousand persons 
per year, which makes it is the most substantial means-tested cash 
benefit in Hungary at this time. 
Means-tested benefits are better targeted than universal ones, 
but they are not necessarily more effective, because the evaluation of 
claims may be costly, they don’t necessarily reach all persons in 
need and may also reduce willingness to work. So far, no detailed 
empirical studies have been made of the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the Hungarian benefit systems: this paper is the first attempt to 
make up for that deficiency. 
We measured the effectiveness of the RSA (whether it reaches 
the target group) in two dimensions: the targeting of regulation and 
of take-up. Regulations impose a strict income ceiling, thus in 2003 
two thirds of households living below the poverty line were not 
eligible. In 2006, the personal income ceiling was abolished, and 
eligibility was only linked to family income, and the income ceiling 
increased., The new system, however, calculates family income for 
consumption units rather than persons, which is higher in larger 
households than the per capita amount. Aggregately, these 
opposing effects resulted in the broadening of the range of 
eligibility: the ratio of eligibility increased by 1 percentage point 
among poor households. 
Based on the year 2003 HBS, we estimated the take-up rate (the 
ratio of persons collecting the benefit within the eligible target 
group) to be 55-57%, which is not worse than in other countries. 
Being well informed and having a strong link to the labour market 
are the factors that have the greatest bearing on the likelihood of 
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taking up the benefit: never having had a job reduced the 
probability of obtaining the benefit by almost 35%. The ratio of 
persons with higher school qualifications is significantly lower 
among aid recipients, which is partly attributable to the stigmatizing 
effect of the benefit. 
We looked at two aspects of effectiveness. On the one hand, we 
examined the overpayment within the system, i.e., the ratio of 
ineligible claiming. Even though 83% of recipients are in the poorer 
third of households, some 30% received the benefit ineligibly, which 
is at least partly made possible by the concealment of income.  On 
the other hand, we looked at the indirect costs of the assistance in 
the sense whether it may reduce willingness to work. The data of 
the CSO Labour Force Survey for the 2001-2004 period indicated 
that both unemployed recipients of regular social assistance and 
persons on public work are less likely to enter non-subsidised 
employment than other unemployed or inactive persons. Benefit 
recipients are 30-35% less likely to enter into employment, and they 
remain unemployed two years longer on average, than their non-
recipient counterparts. This, however, may partly be attributable to 
the non-observed characteristics of recipients. 
Accordingly, both efficiency and effectiveness could be 
improved by modifying the regulation of the RSA.  
In respect of the targeting of the needy, we recommend the re-
consideration of the merger, in 2000, of the RSA with the income 
supplement to the unemployed. That is because the abolished 
former benefit used to be a purely social benefit, and its role has not 
been re-delegated to any kind of assistance. In 2003, most of the 
poor households ineligible for the RSA would have been excluded 
on account of the employment of the household members. 
Underpayment could be improved even by a slight increase of 
the eligibility ceiling: over 40% of the ineligible poor households 
would have their claim denied because the per capita household 
income exceeds the eligibility ceiling (though it is below the poverty 
line). 
According to our estimates, over 40% of eligible persons do not 
receive the benefit, partly because of the insufficient information 
level of eligible persons, partly due to the stigmatising effect of the 
benefit. Thus, in order to improve the effectiveness of the benefit, it 
would be necessary to improve the dissemination of information 
and to study and address the attitudes relating to the benefit. 
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The ratio of ineligible claimants is not significant, even though 
the system does contain some overpayment, which could be 
reduced through improving controls and introducing incentives to 
local governments in this respect. 
The rules of eligibility also contain some elements, however, 
that result in overpayment or inefficient targeting. In 2006, the 
former dual income criterion was abolished, and the RSA was 
transformed into a family benefit, so that now local governments, 
when evaluating eligibility, only look at the family income per 
consumption unit, and the amount of the benefit supplements that 
amount to 90% of the minimum pension. However, poverty and 
need would be better reflected, and the targeting of the benefit 
improved, if household income, rather than the family income 
specified in the Social Act, was to be considered as the basis of 
eligibility. Need is determined not by the closeness of family 
relations but the distribution of expenditures within the household, 
therefore it would be more adequate to consider the income of all 
household members when determining need. This would take into 
account the redistribution of incomes within the household, and 
thus provides a better measure of actual need. 
Targeting was improved by the introduction of the 
consumption unit instead of the per capita income because the latter 
gave an unjustified advantage to larger households. In contrast, the 
legislator, when defining the consumption unit, made allowances to 
larger families, because children have been given considerably 
greater weighting than in international practice. Using the 
household income (instead of family income) and adjusting the 
consumer unit ratios together would reduce the average benefit 
amount by approximately 30%, which would free up resources for 
an increase in the income ceiling. 
According to the intention of the legislator, the regular social 
assistance, taking on the role of the former income supplement, is 
meant to help the long-term unemployed, trying to ‘keep them 
afloat and re-integrate them into the world of labour’. In contrast, 
our results indicate that in practice this benefit acts mainly as an 
income supplement to the long-term unemployed, i.e., it fails to 
attain its employment objectives. Therefore, we would recommend a 
reconsideration of that the introduction of the employment test for 
the RSA. However, in order to encourage employment, it would be 
also necessary to look into the operational problems of public work 
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programmes, and to assess what other pro-employment measures, 
successfully used in other countries, could be introduced. 
This paper reflects the views of the authors 
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Appendix 
F1. Income items used for determining eligibility 
Personal incomes Personal Family 
Gross income from full-time job   × 
Lump-sum settlement   
Fee of life and retirement insurance paid by the employer   
Income from secondary employment   × 
Entrepreneurial income  × 
Corporate wage and divident  × 
Income from intellectual work  × 
Tip, gratuity   
Income from irregular work or single assignment   × 
Income from moveables and real estate  × × 
Other income × × 
Retirement pension × × 
Pension supplement  × 
Old age benefit  × 
Invalidity annuity  × 
Regular benefit  × 
Irregular benefit × × 
Child care fee, child care allowance, child raising support, 
maternity assistance 
 × 
Scholarship  × 
Sick pay  × 
Regular social assistance for the unemployed  × 
Unemployment benefit  × 
Jobseeker’s benefit   
Nursing allowance × × 
Life-annuity received for compensation notes  × 
Child care allowance recipients’ remaining income supplement    
Wage and other income from abroad  × 
Other household income   
Family allowance  × 
Orphan’s allowance  × 
Child support  × 
Child protection support  × 
Maternity benefit   
Child(ren)’s income under the age of 16   
Received home maintenance support  × 
Interest payment, dividend, affix  × 
Money received form insurance company  × 
Other income  × 
Received life-annuity  × 
Income from selling real estate  × 
Received wealth from selling  × 
Sold compensation notes  × 
Money from own saving   
Social allowance, loans that need not to be repaid   
Agricultural income   
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F2. Description of probit models used for examining targeting37 
 
From 1993 the Central Statistical Office has returned to the yearly surveying of 
the Household Budget Survey. The sample contains 10 000 households’ and 22-
25 thousand individuals’ consumption and demand habits and other 
characteristics. 
 
Drivers of legitimate claiming 
 
The regression results disclosed under the analysis of illegitimate claiming 
come from the following model: The regression analyses were run on the group 
of benefit recipients. The dependent variable was non-eligible recipient status. 
The explanatory variables and their average values for the recipient group and 
the entire sample: 
 
Average value 
Variable name Eligible 
persons Total 
Logarithm of estimated amount of aid 9,60 7,38 
Logarithm of the per capita family income (HUF) used to determine the 
eligibility criterion (see in Appendix F1.) 9,56 11,50 
Unemployment rate of the county (%) 0,08 0,06 
Schooling, elementary school (1: yes, 0: no) 0,52 0,44 
Schooling, vocational school (1: yes, 0: no) 0,33 0,21 
Schooling, highschool (1: yes, 0: no) 0,12 0,23 
Schooling, college or university (1: yes, 0: no, reference) 0,03 0,13 
Child in family, younger than 15 years(1: yes, 0: no) 0,57 0,45 
Settlement type, Budapest (1: yes, 0: no) 0,04 0,16 
Settlement type, cities of county rank (1: yes, 0: no) 0,09 0,20 
Settlement type, other towns (1: yes, 0: no) 0,30 0,27 
Settlement type, villages (1: yes, 0: no, reference) 0,57 0,37 
Age, 18-24 years (1: yes, 0: no) 0,17 0,10 
Age, 24-35 years (1: yes, 0: no) 0,25 0,15 
Age, 35-54 years (1: yes, 0: no) 0,52 0,31 
Age, above 55 years (1: yes, 0: no, reference) 0,05 0,22 
Never worked before (1: yes, 0: no) 0,15 0,13 
At most one active person in household (1: yes, 0: no) 0,79 0,73 
Estimates are probit estimates based on heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors. 
 
Drivers of illegitimate claiming 
 
Analyses of the illegitimate claiming is based on the following regression 
                                                 
37 The probit model estimates how the various characteristics of the individual, 
having eliminated other effects, influence the probability of actually collecting 
the benefit if eligible. 
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results. Regressions were run on the eligible persons. The dependent variable 
was the non-eligible beneficiary status. The explanatory variables and their 
average values on the eligible and on the whole sample are as follows: 
 
Average value 
Variable name 
Eligible persons Total 
Difference from the per capita household income limit (17740 HUF), per 
month, in thousand HUF 3,37 15,8 
Per capita income from casual work (thousand HUF / month) 1,02 0,74 
Logarithm of the income from casual work 3,98 0,65 
Sex (1: male, 0: female) 0,57 0,47 
Age (in years) 39,38 37,21 
There is no active member of the household (1: yes, 0: no) 0,40 0,28 
Schooling, not finished elementary school (1: yes, 0: no) 0,10 0,22 
Schooling, elementary school (1: yes, 0: no) 0,43 0,21 
Schooling, technical school (1: yes, 0: no) 0,32 0,21 
Schooling, highschool (1: yes, 0: no) 0,05 0,08 
Schooling, vocational schools (1: yes, 0: no) 0,09 0,15 
Schooling, college or university (1: yes, 0: no) 0,00 0,13 
Region: Southern Great Plain (1: yes, 0: no) 0,09 0,16 
Region: Southern Transdanubia (1: yes, 0: no) 0,15 0,09 
Region: Northern Great Plain (1: yes, 0: no) 0,29 0,15 
Region: Northern Hungary (1: yes, 0: no) 0,37 0,15 
Region Central Transdanubia (1: yes, 0: no) 0,03 0,10 
Region: Central Hungary (1: yes, 0: no) 0,06 0,25 
Region: Western Transdanubia (1: yes, 0: no) 0,02 0,10 
Settlement type, Budapest (1: yes, 0: no) 0,01 0,16 
Settlement type, cities of county rank (1: yes, 0: no) 0,10 0,20 
Settlement type, other towns (1: yes, 0: no) 0,27 0,27 
Settlement type, villages (1: yes, 0: no) 0,62 0,37 
Estimates are probit estimates based on heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors. 
 
F3. Description of the models used for analysing the effect on labour 
supply: 
 
For the examination of the labour market effects of the benefit, we used the 
quarterly figures of the Labour Force Survey of the Central Statistical Office 
between 2001-2004, connected into waves. We estimated the probit model on 
the active-age unemployed, and the duration model on unemployed persons 
exhausting their UI during the observation period. For both models, we had the 
following variables available: 
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Average value 
Variable Contents, definition Amongst non 
workers 
In duration 
model 
Quitting 
Binary variable (bv), it’s value is 1, if person did 
not work in the given quarter but worked one 
quarter after.  
0,1866 0,0731 
RSA bv: 1, if receives RSA 0,1647 0,3920 
Social work bv: 1, if does socal work 0,0223 0,0469 
Active labour market 
programs (ALMP) bv:1, if participates in ALMP 0,0124 0,0623 
PRUA bv: 1, if receives pre-retirement unemployment assistance 0,0060 0,0114 
Jobseeker’s aid bv: 1, if reciesves jobseeker’s aid 0,1288 0,0497 
Reservation wage The minimum wage at which the person is willing to work (in thousand HUF) 24,4616 29,561 
Duration of 
unemployment  Number of months since last employed 6,8013 9,9819 
Duration2 of 
unemployment The previous squared 250,2318 237,3384 
Sex bv, 0: male, 1: female,  0,4992 0,3982 
Age, 18-24 years bv: age, 18-24 years 0,1947 0,1211 
Age, 24-35 years bv: age, 24-35 years 0,2871 0,2909 
Age, 35-54 years bv: age, 35-54 years 0,4568 0,5297 
Age over 55 years bv: age over 55 years 0,0614 0,0583 
Number of months 
since registration Number of months since registration 6,5428 11,9514 
Number of months 
since registration2 The previous squared 233,4444 317,7411 
Spuse works bv: does the spouse work? 0,3455 0,3074 
Noone works in the 
family bv: noone works in the family 0,6822 0,6829 
Only one person works in 
the family bv: only one person works in the family 0,1944 0,1931 
No child bv: no child in the family 0,5753 0,6005 
Big family bv: 3 or more children in the family 0,0724 0,0657 
Infant in family bv: infant in the family younger than 5 0,2254 0,3268 
UR of the county Unemployment rate of the county 0,0635 0,0733 
UR of the region Unemployment rate of the region 0,0705 0,0907 
Central Hungary bv: 1, if lives in Central Hungary 0,1519 0,0491 
Southern Transdanubia bv: 1, if lives in Southern Transdanubia 0,1435 0,1749 
Western Transdanubia bv: 1, if lives in Western Transdanubia 0,0813 0,0669 
Central Transdanubia bv: 1, if lives in Central Transdanubia 0,1000 0,1068 
Northern Great Plain bv: 1, if lives in Northern Great Plain 0,2001 0,2463 
Southern Great Plain. bv: 1, if lives in Southern Great Plain 0,1328 0,1314 
Northern Hungary bv: 1, if lives in Northern Hungary 0,1903 0,2246 
Elementary school bv: highest education is elementary school 0,3934 0,3982 
Vocational school bv: highest education is vocational school 0,3179 0,3926 
Secondary education bv: highest education is highschool 0,2181 0,1903 
Tertiary education bv: college, university, doctoral program 0,0706 0,0189 
Previously worked bv: worked before becoming unemployed 0,3307 0,5615 
Previously studied bv: studied before becoming unemployed 0,0392 0,0058 
Previously in the army bv: in the army before becoming unemployed 0,0094 0,0065 
Previously stayed at 
home 
bv: stayed at home before becoming 
unemployed  0,0126 0,0043 
Previously child care bv: on child care allowance / fee before 0,0233 0,0258 
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allowance / fee becoming unemployed  
Previously else bv: done something else before becoming unemployed  0,0268 0,0331 
1st quarter bv: observed in the 1st quarter 0,2652 0,1777 
2nd quarter bv: observed in the 2nd quarter 0,2536 0,2149 
3rd quarter bv: observed in the 3rd quarter 0,3149 0,2891 
4th quarter bv: observed in the 4th quarter 0,1663 0,3183 
2001 bv: observed in 20001 0,4418 0,0834 
2002 bv: observed in 20002 0,3746 0,3989 
2003 bv: observed in 20003 0,1107 0,1886 
2004 bv: observed in 20004 0,0729 0,3291 
 
Drivers of the probability of taking up employment – probit model 
 
In this paper the determinants of the probability of taking up employment are 
from the following probit regression. Dependent variable is the probability of 
finding (quitting) a job a quarter later: 
– regular social assistance and public work 
– participation in active labourmarket programs and other benefits: 
jobseeker’s aid and pre-retirement unemployment assistance 
– reservation wage  
– duration of unemployment and registered unemployment, and their squares 
– age: between 25-34, 35-54 and over 55 years (benchmark age interval: 
between 18-24 years) 
– unemployment rate of the county  
– regions: Central Hungary, Southern Transdanubia, Western Transdanubia, 
Northern Great Plain, Southern Great Plain, Northern Hungary (benchmark 
region: Central Transdanubia) 
– highest education level: vocational school, high school, collage, and university 
(benchmark education level: elementary) 
– number of family members working in the household: spouse works, no one 
works, only one member works 
– number of children and their age in the family: no children, big family, small 
family 
– prior labour market status: in school, in the army, at home, child care 
allowance / fee, other (benchmark status: employed) 
– quarter of observation: quarter 1-3 (benchmark quarter: 4th quarter) 
Determinants of the conditional probability of becoming employed taken into account the 
length of the observed unemployment – duration model  
 
Dependent variable: becoming employed one quarter after (Fail). Explanatory 
variables: 
– regular social assistance  
– reservation wage 
– duration of registered unemployment, and their squares 
– age: between 18-24, 25-34 and 35-54 years (benchmark age interval: over 55 
years) 
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– highest education level: elementary school, vocational school, high school, 
collage, and university (benchmark education level: not even elementary school) 
– infant in the family 
– spouse works 
– unemployment rate of the region 
– year and quarter of observation: year 2 - year 4, quarter 2 – quarter 4 
(benchmark year and quarter: 1st year and 1st quarter)  
– t1, t2, t3, t4 (necessary variables of duration models) 
Estimates were made by the Jenkins method (assuming discrete time, with logit 
estimate function). 
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